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Piercing the (Sovereign) Veil: The Role of Limited 
Liability in State-Owned Enterprises 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier* 
Sovereign nations own more than ten percent of the world’s 
largest firms and use these ownership stakes to pursue economic, 
social, and political objectives unrelated to profit maximization. 
Sovereign nations also have unique powers and attributes that 
“ordinary” owners lack. Sovereigns do not need an owner’s 
control rights to direct entity behavior; they have the power to 
regulate. Sovereigns do not need an owner’s economic rights to 
extract value; they have the power to tax. And sovereigns do not 
need to hide behind the principle of limited liability, which protects 
owners of limited liability entities; they have sovereign immunity 
in both domestic and foreign courts. 
Despite these fundamental differences, neither courts nor 
legal scholars have seriously examined whether organizational 
law should distinguish sovereigns from other owners. This Article 
takes up that question, focusing on the law of veil piercing as 
applied to corporations and other limited liability entities owned 
by sovereign states. Its first contribution is to demonstrate that 
the principle of limited liability does different work for sovereign 
states than for ordinary shareholders. That principle’s primary 
function is to create a partition between the owner’s assets and 
those belonging to the entity. Because the partition yields 
important economic benefits, veil piercing is reserved for 
exceptional cases. But foreign states do not need organizational 
law to realize these benefits. The law of foreign sovereign 
immunity already protects the state’s assets in ways that mimic 
the protections of organizational law. By contrast, state-owned 
entities rely on organizational law for asset protection.  
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Put differently, in the sovereign context, organizational law 
mostly protects entities. 
In the United States, the law of veil piercing in this context 
derives from the Supreme Court’s seminal Bancec case. The 
Article’s second contribution is to demonstrate that Bancec 
supports its clarified understanding of the relevance of 
organizational law. Indeed, Bancec was a reverse veil piercing 
case in which a creditor of a foreign state asserted a claim against 
a state-owned firm. Bancec’s emphasis on the traditional asset-
protective function of organizational law must be understood in 
that context. Bancec does not stand for the proposition that 
foreign states should receive the same protections as ordinary 
shareholders. The Article closes by exploring implications of this 
analysis. Perhaps the most important (if counter-intuitive) 
implication is that courts should be more receptive to traditional 
veil piercing claims, at least in a subset of cases. 
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When should the law respect the separate legal status of 
corporations or other limited liability entities owned by foreign 
governments? To use a prominent contemporary example, the 
Venezuelan economy was in free-fall even before the onset of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. The government and its state-owned oil 
company, Pétroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), are mired in debt and 
in the crosshairs of creditors.1 Should courts in the United States 
and elsewhere let one entity’s disappointed creditors attach assets 
owned by the other?2 The question implicates familiar principles of 
organizational law. The defining feature of the modern limited 
liability entity is that it creates a partition between assets belonging 
to the entity and assets belonging to owners.3 Shareholders are not 
usually liable for corporate debts,4 nor must a corporation typically 
answer to its owners’ creditors.5 These features of corporate law are 
so well-known they are often reduced to metaphor. Corporations, 
we say, are separate legal persons.6 
Nothing about the metaphor implies that the owner’s identity 
will affect the corporation’s treatment. And in fact, courts also 
 
 1. Andrew Scurria, Venezuela Creditor Cleared to Resume Citgo Seizure Efforts, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 30, 2019, 3:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-creditor-cleared-to-
resume-citgo-seizure-efforts-11569865813?st=x4p29kfsglpyo43; Caroline Simson, U.S. Urges 
Del. Judge to Pause Crystallex’s Bid for Citgo, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2020, 5:59 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1305785/us-urges-del-judge-to-pause-crystallex-s-bid-
for-citgo; Clifford Krauss, Venezuela’s Crisis Imperils CITGO, Its American ‘Cash Cow’,  
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/business/energy-
environment/venezuela-citgo-oil-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=1.  
 2. For example, a creditor of the Venezuelan government holding $1.4 billion 
judgment resulting from an arbitration award recently attached PDVSA’s equity interest in 
the ultimate U.S. parent company of CITGO petroleum. Krauss, supra note 1. 
 3. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (2016); Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 390 (1992). 
 5. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:1 (2016). Incorporation also 
protects corporate assets from some claims by shareholders, including attempts to recover 
an investment by forcing a liquidation or dissolution of the corporation. Margaret M. Blair, 
Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth 
Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392 (2003). This is not to say that the presumption is equally 
firm in all cases. 
 6. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001); Riverdale 
Cotton Mills v. Ala. & Ga. Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 188, 199 (1905); see also Jonathan Macey & Joshua 
Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 
100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 100 (2014). 
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respect the separate legal status of corporations owned by foreign 
sovereigns.7 But it is less obvious why this should be so. Sovereign 
states do not need organizational law as much, or in the same ways, 
as other owners.8 Despite this, the law often draws no distinction 
between state-owned and other corporations. For example, when 
deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil of a corporation 
owned by a foreign sovereign—thus letting the corporation’s 
creditors reach state assets, and potentially vice versa—courts in 
the United States apply familiar corporate law rules without asking 
whether this makes sense in context. 
This Article examines the law of veil piercing as applied to 
corporations and other limited liability entities owned by sovereign 
states. I focus on foreign sovereigns—that is, entities recognized as 
states under international law, challenged in the courts of another 
such state or before an international tribunal.9 Veil piercing is 
among the most important de-partitioning remedies under U.S. law 
and can have enormous practical consequences.10 To return to the 
Venezuelan context, the government and PDVSA separately owe 
over $200 billion, which they cannot pay, and have already 
defaulted on much of the debt. This mountain of debt will prove 
hard to restructure—among other reasons, because there is no 
bankruptcy mechanism allowing sovereign states to impose 
restructuring terms on a dissenting creditor minority.11 The 
prospects for successful restructuring will dim further if courts do 
not respect the boundary between the government and its oil 
company.12 In fact, courts already have disregarded that boundary, 
 
 7. See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,  
462 U.S. 611, 625 (1983). 
 8. See infra Section I.B. 
 9. Similar arguments could be made, of course, with regard to other types of 
sovereign-owned entities. In the U.S. context, this might include entities controlled by state 
or tribal governments. 
 10. Henry Hansmann & Richard Squire, External and Internal Asset Partitioning: 
Corporations and Their Subsidiaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
 11. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (1999). 
 12. The reasons are complicated but stem from the fact that creditors who successfully 
pierce the corporate veil have less reason to fear contract-based restructuring mechanisms. 
For example, many of Venezuela’s loan contracts have so-called collective action clauses, 
which let the government impose restructuring terms on dissenting creditors if a creditor 
majority approves a restructuring plan. But PDVSA’s creditors did not assent to these 
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allowing a creditor of the government to attach PDVSA’s 
ownership stake in U.S. oil refiner CITGO Petroleum.13 
One cannot have a principled veil piercing doctrine without 
understanding why the corporate form matters in the first place,14 
and the reasons differ for sovereign states than for other 
shareholders. In the usual context, a shareholder’s control over the 
corporation derives largely from voting and other rights attendant 
to stock ownership.15 Sovereigns may value these rights but can 
assert control without them.16 In the usual context, owners rely on 
limited liability to shield personal assets from the entity’s creditors, 
and to protect the entity from owners’ creditors. But sovereigns do 
not need organizational law to the same extent to partition assets. 
That is because the law of foreign sovereign immunity 
automatically creates a partition between assets the state uses for 
commercial activities and assets it devotes to other purposes.17 
With limited exceptions, creditors can enforce claims only against 
commercial assets. Moreover, the law in the United States further 
partitions commercial assets owned by a foreign state into separate 
pools associated with different commercial activities.18 This result, 
which owes no debt whatsoever to organizational law, loosely 
resembles the modern business firm, which siloes risks associated 
with distinct commercial activities into multiple, legally separate 
entities.19 To be sure, sovereign states do want foreign courts to 
respect the corporate form, and their reasons are not entirely 
distinct from those that motivate other shareholders.  
 
contracts. If allowed to enforce their claims against government assets, they may be in  
a position to disrupt the government’s future access to foreign financial and  
commercial markets. 
 13. See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 333 F. Supp. 3d 380  
(D. Del. 2018) (granting motion by creditor holding arbitration award against Venezuela to 
attach PDVSA’s equity stake in CITGO Holding), aff’d, 932 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 2762 (2020). 
 14. David Milton, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of 
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1326 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil 
Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001). 
 15. Poonam Puri, The Future of Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance,  
48 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 427, 428 (2009); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law:  
The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 652–53 (2006). 
 16. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 17. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). 
 19. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 400–01. 
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But organizational law does work for sovereigns distinct from work 
done for other types of shareholders.20 
Part I of this Article provides background on the asset 
partitioning benefits of organizational law. These include 
protecting owners from creditors of the entity and, perhaps more 
important, protecting the entity from its owners’ creditors. Part I 
also describes veil piercing doctrine as it has evolved in the 
traditional context. In First National City Bank v. Banco Para el 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), the U.S. Supreme Court 
presumptively recognized the separate legal status of entities 
owned by foreign governments.21 When creditors try to overcome 
this presumption, courts have incorporated veil piercing doctrine 
almost wholesale—albeit with one important modification22—from 
the traditional context. That practice might be justified if sovereign 
states need organizational law for the same reasons as other 
shareholders. And to an extent, Bancec suggests that they do; much 
of the Court’s reasoning emphasizes the familiar asset-partitioning 
benefits of organizational law. Part I closes, however, by 
highlighting an important, but often overlooked, limitation of 
Bancec’s reasoning. The case involved the role of organizational law 
in protecting state-owned entities from the sovereign’s creditors.  
It did not require the Court to consider the extent to which 
sovereigns require similar protection or to articulate reasons for 
insulating foreign states from the liabilities of state-owned firms. 
Part I explains why sovereign states differ from other owners of 
firms. Importantly, I focus on disputes arising out of commercial 
activities conducted by foreign states or state-owned entities. I do 
not focus on other potential sources of liability, such as cases arising 
from acts of state-sponsored terrorism or from expropriation in 
 
 20. Sovereigns also implicate concerns, such as comity and reciprocity, that are 
present but less pronounced in cases involving privately-owned foreign corporations.  
This is not to say that veil piercing decisions are—or should be—premised on notions of 
comity or reciprocity. It is not clear that such considerations can produce principled results. 
The claim is descriptive: courts explicitly (and sometimes implicitly) take these 
considerations into account when deciding whether to pierce the veil of an entity owned by 
a foreign sovereign. See First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba 
(Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 626 (1983). 
 21. Id. at 627. 
 22. See infra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
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violation of international law. These scenarios implicate a different 
and less protective set of sovereign immunity rules.23 
In the commercial context relevant here, one difference relates 
to the mechanisms by which sovereign states wield control over 
state-owned entities. States view these entities as policy vehicles, 
often for achieving objectives unrelated to profit maximization.24 
Political actors may value ownership as a lever of control.25 But 
because the owner is sovereign, it has many other levers, such as 
the ability to regulate. This complicates the application of veil 
piercing doctrine. A state may extensively wield power as an owner 
without implicating any policy relevant to organizational law. By 
contrast, it may extensively wield power as a sovereign to 
accomplish goals that would be forbidden to any other owner. 
A second difference relates to the reasons why states need 
organizational law. As noted, states benefit from an important kind 
of asset partitioning by default. The law of foreign sovereign 
immunity, at least in the United States, effectively divides a state’s 
assets into distinct pools associated with distinct commercial 
activities. Because of this, sovereigns already enjoy significant 
owner protections; they do not need limited liability in the same way 
as non-sovereign owners.26 To be sure, organizational law still does 
some work in this context; it allows the sovereign to further 
subdivide assets associated with the same commercial activity  
into distinct, legally-separate pools. But the protections  
already afforded by sovereign immunity reduce the importance of 
this function. 
For sovereigns, organizational law functions primarily as a 
means of partitioning contracts, not assets. Many of the protections 
of sovereign immunity can be waived by contract, and one 
 
 23. Indeed, in some scenarios U.S. law automatically disregards the separate legal 
status of state-owned entities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (permitting attachment and execution 
on property owned by a state agency or instrumentality whether or not Bancec factors are 
present); see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) (holding that 
notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g), creditors must demonstrate that the property at issue is 
not otherwise immune from attachment and execution under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–10). 
 24. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 25. Cf. Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 
(discussing relationship between shareholders and corporations); ALDO MUSACCHIO & 
SERGIO G. LAZZARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM: LEVIATHAN IN BUSINESS, BRAZIL AND 
BEYOND 7–13 (2014) (discussing ownership models for state-owned entities and varieties of 
state capitalism). 
 26. See infra Section I.B.2. 
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consequence of veil piercing is that courts may impute the entity’s 
contractual obligations to the owner.27 State-owned entities can 
bestow upon creditors contract rights—especially arbitration 
clauses and waivers of sovereign immunity—that would be costly 
for the sovereign to grant. If imputed to the sovereign itself, these 
contract rights will dramatically reduce the protections of 
sovereign immunity law. Respecting the boundaries imposed by 
organizational law ensures that this happens only in rare cases. 
When it comes to entity protections, however, organizational law 
plays a crucial role for state-owned firms, just as it does in the usual 
context. The reason is that sovereign immunity offers less 
protection to state-owned firms than it offers to the state itself.  
A legally-separate entity qualifies for immunity (if at all) only as an 
“agency or instrumentality” of the state.28 If a foreign state is its 
majority owner, the entity will typically be entitled to sovereign 
immunity.29 The same is true of many non-U.S. entities over which 
the sovereign wields significant control.30 But for other entities, 
such as most subsidiaries of state-owned firms, sovereign 
immunity does no work whatsoever. Moreover, even when 
protected by sovereign immunity, state agencies and 
instrumentalities receive less protection than the state itself.31 
Organizational law thus serves its traditional asset-protective 
function in this context. 
Part II explores implications, beginning with questions 
implicated by the myriad ways in which sovereign states exercise 
control over state-owned entities. As noted, when dealing with 
such entities, courts in the United States have imported veil 
piercing doctrine almost wholesale from the traditional corporate 
context. But there is one important exception. In the traditional 
context, courts occasionally assert that veil piercing is appropriate 
when the owner “dominates or controls” the entity, without 
explicitly requiring that the owner use its control to harm creditors 
 
 27. See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). 
 29. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 30. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 31. See infra notes 188–91 and accompanying text. 
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or subvert important legal policies.32 This is the so-called “alter 
ego” justification for veil piercing.33 In practice, however, courts do 
not invoke the alter ego theory to pierce the veil of an ordinary 
limited liability entity unless the owner’s domination of the entity 
produces “some fraud or wrong mandating disregard of the 
corporate form.”34 By contrast, when the entity is owned by a 
foreign sovereign, control alone can justify veil piercing.35 
Moreover, while many of the alter ego cases involving foreign 
sovereigns involve some degree of fraud or wrongdoing, there are 
cases in which courts pierce the veil without identifying any 
concrete harm resulting from the sovereign’s control.36 
Part II attempts to articulate a principled justification for (and 
limitations on) the rule that a foreign sovereign’s domination of an 
entity justifies veil piercing without specific proof of fraud or 
injustice.37 Sensibly understood, the alter ego theory rests on the 
insight that control can be used to both enable and obscure the 
opportunistic subordination of creditors. In particular, some 
manifestations of control permit debtors to strategically declare 
that an asset in fact belongs to another party. Outside of the 
sovereign context, for instance, an owner might keep such poor 
records that one cannot tell whether an asset belongs to the 
corporation or to the owner.38 When control is manifested in such  
 
 32. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 
(2d Cir. 1993); Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. 
v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., 909 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 33. TNS Holdings, Inc. v. MKI Sec. Corp., 703 N.E.2d 749, 751 (N.Y. 1998). 
 34. See, e.g., id. 
 35. See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text. 
 36. For example, in the Crystallex litigation, the district court invoked the alter ego 
theory to allow creditors of Venezuela to attach assets belonging to state-owned PDVSA. 
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 395–98 
(D. Del. 2018). Despite noting that the alter ego theory “inherently assumes that some 
element of unfairness would result if the Court fails to treat one entity as the alter ego of the 
other,” the court did not identify any unfairness that would result in that case. Id. at 397 n.15. 
 37. When a creditor seeks to impute an entity’s conduct to its state owner, the alter 
ego theory does not require that the state actually direct the entity’s liability-generating 
conduct. In such cases, agency law might provide a basis for imposing liability on the state; 
there would be no need for the alter ego theory. See infra notes 198–201. 
 38. See Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 113. 
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a way, veil piercing is appropriate to prevent debtors from 
unilaterally declaring assets to be beyond the creditors’ reach.39 
Similar principles are in play when the entity is owned by a 
foreign sovereign. In this context, however, the law of foreign 
sovereign immunity, more than organizational law, determines the 
rights of creditors. Part II argues that, if courts are to treat control 
alone as sufficient to pierce the veil, they should make clear that a 
sovereign’s domination of an entity matters only when the 
sovereign uses its control to subvert the law of foreign sovereign 
immunity. That law—represented in the United States by the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)—allows foreign 
states and state-owned entities to forge commercial ties with the 
United States but requires them to place at risk their assets 
associated with liability-generating activity.40 Veil piercing under a 
pure alter ego theory is appropriate when (and only when) a  
state violates this implicit bargain, using control over an entity to 
engage in commerce while keeping non-immune assets away  
from creditors. 
Part II also examines whether the source of a state’s control 
rights should affect the veil piercing analysis. Some courts arguably 
have suggested that acts taken in the exercise of “sovereign 
powers” should be disregarded for purposes of the veil piercing 
inquiry. What matters, these courts suggest, is whether the 
sovereign abuses its rights as owner. But it makes little sense to draw 
such a distinction. It is the purpose for which the state uses its 
control that matters. There is no meaningful difference between, 
 
 39. Id. By contrast, other forms of control, such as failure to hold regular directors’ 
meetings, do not create the risk of opportunism; it “makes no sense” to premise veil piercing 
on such matters. Id. 
 40. The point is not that the state must place at risk sufficient assets to cover 
anticipated liabilities. Instead, it is that the law of foreign sovereign immunity recognizes 
that states often behave as commercial actors and insists that, to the extent this happens, the 
state should not gain unfair advantage over private commercial actors. A primary 
motivation for the U.S. government’s adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity was 
concern that the law of foreign sovereign immunity was giving an advantage to state-owned 
firms, especially those in Soviet bloc countries. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal 
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting U.S. Attorney General  
(May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 969, 985 (June 23, 1952) (noting that the desire to insulate 
state-owned firms acting abroad “obviously motivate[d]” the Soviet Union’s continued 
embrace of absolute immunity); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6–7 (1976) (noting that “foreign 
state enterprises are every day participants in commercial activities” and that extending 
immunity to such cases “call[ed] into question whether our citizens will have access to the 
courts in order to resolve ordinary legal disputes”). 
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say, a dividend payment that leaves a state-owned corporation 
insolvent and a confiscatory tax (or mandatory contribution to 
social programs) that produces the same result. 
Finally, Part II offers tentative thoughts on whether courts 
should be more (or less) willing to pierce the veil of an entity owned 
by a foreign sovereign. Any case involving such an entity 
implicates considerations of comity and reciprocity that are muted, 
although not entirely absent, in other settings. For instance, courts 
hesitate to pierce the veil of state-owned entities so that foreign 
jurisdictions will reciprocate when asked to pierce the veil of a U.S. 
corporation acting abroad.41 Despite this, there is an argument that 
courts have been too reluctant to impute the liabilities of a  
state-owned entity to its sovereign owner, especially in cases where 
the entity’s contracts do not impose significant additional risk for 
the sovereign. By contrast, courts should be especially reluctant to 
allow the sovereign’s creditors to reach assets owned by a  
state-owned entity. Here, organizational law serves its usual  
entity-shielding function, and considerations of comity and 
reciprocity provide additional reason for caution. 
I. WHY (AND WHETHER) ORGANIZATIONAL LAW MATTERS 
At the outset, let me offer three points of clarification. First, 
except when greater precision is needed, I will use the term “veil 
piercing” broadly to refer to several, ostensibly separate, 
justifications for disregarding the separate legal status of a limited 
liability entity. For example, some courts understand the alter ego 
theory to permit veil piercing based only on a shareholder’s 
“domination or control” of the corporation, whether or not that 
control results in any clearly-identified fraud or unfairness to a 
creditor.42 Other courts have invoked agency law,43 often without 
 
 41. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29–30 (“If U.S. law did not respect the separate 
juridical identities of different agencies or instrumentalities, it might encourage foreign 
jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions between different U.S. corporations or 
between a U.S. corporation and its independent subsidiary.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 
(2d Cir. 1993); Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). See 
generally Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter Ego,” 
and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability: Back 
Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 405,  
412–15 (2006). 
 43. Pearson, 247 F.3d at 487 n.5. 
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making clear whether and how this differs from other analyses.44 
These distinctions appear in cases involving both sovereign and 
non-sovereign shareholders. 
Second, I am mostly concerned with the law of the United 
States. Although state law usually governs veil piercing questions, 
federal law governs when a foreign sovereign is the owner.45 
Although focused on U.S. law, I will occasionally note how the 
United States differs from other countries in its application of the 
law of foreign sovereign immunity.46 Because of these differences, 
a U.S. court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil can have greater 
consequences outside of the United States, if recognized by courts 
in other countries.47 
Finally, I should be clear what I mean when I refer to a state-
owned corporation. Governments of all sorts hold ownership 
stakes of all kinds in many different limited liability entities.48  
I will mostly ignore differences in entity type and will use the  
terms “sovereign-owned” and “state-owned” interchangeably and 
only when: 
• an entity is organized under a law that entitles it to 
separate legal status, and 
 
 44. In some cases, it appears that the court invokes agency law as a metaphor, “simply 
to justify a conclusion that . . . liability should follow from shareholder control.” Milton, supra 
note 14, at 1332. These cases often lack evidence—central to finding that an actual agency 
relationship exists—that the controlling shareholder assented to have the subsidiary act on 
its behalf. Id. At least a few cases, however, more carefully distinguish agency law from veil 
piercing doctrine. See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Republic of Venez.,  
200 F.3d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 45. Principles of international law may also inform the analysis. See Bancec,  
462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983). 
 46. E.g., infra notes 170, 175–76 and accompanying text. 
 47. In particular, many countries allow creditors to enforce claims by attaching and 
executing upon all commercial assets of a foreign state. See, e.g., State Immunity Act, (1978) 
§ 13(4) HALS. STAT. (UK). Under U.S. law, by contrast, a creditor whose claim arises out of a 
foreign state’s commercial activity, and who does not benefit from a waiver of sovereign 
immunity or arbitration award, generally may attach an asset if the asset is “used for a 
commercial activity in the United States” and when the asset “is or was used for the 
commercial activity upon which the claim is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a), (a)(2). It is this latter 
requirement—of a nexus between the asset and the claim—that creates a partition between 
pools of assets devoted to distinct commercial activities. For further discussion, see infra 
Section I.B.2.a. 
 48. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES (2005) (summarizing practices of OECD 
member states with regard to state ownership). 
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• a foreign state (as that term is defined under 
international law), or a political subdivision, agency, or 
instrumentality of such a state, directly or indirectly 
holds a controlling ownership interest.49 
When an entity meets these criteria, (i) the law of foreign 
sovereign immunity protects the owner (although the protection is 
not absolute), (ii) the law of foreign sovereign immunity may 
protect the entity, and (iii) the state has demonstrated that it values 
the control and other rights associated with ownership.50 The 
definition excludes entities whose owners cannot claim immunity 
as foreign sovereigns. For example, it does not cover lawsuits in U.S. 
courts against corporations created by U.S. states or by Native 
American tribal governments. Such entities raise similar questions 
but merit separate treatment, as the applicable rules of immunity 
derive from domestic law. 
For an example of an entity that meets this definition, return 
again to Venezuela and its relationship to state oil company 
PDVSA. Venezuela is a foreign state. In addition to PDVSA, it owns 
other legally independent Venezuelan entities, such as heavy 
industry conglomerate Corporación Venezolana de Guayana 
(CVG). The law of foreign sovereign immunity regards such 
entities as agencies or instrumentalities of the state.51 Sovereign 
immunity protects them, although to a lesser extent than it protects 
the state itself.52 Each state-owned firm conducts operations 
through domestic (and at times foreign) subsidiaries. Venezuelan 
 
 49. Under international law, a state is an entity with a defined territory and permanent 
population, under the control of its own government, that engages or has the capacity to 
engage in formal relations with other such entities. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). A state can hold a 
controlling interest without holding the majority of voting shares. See generally ORG. FOR 
ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES (2015 ed. 2015) (defining ownership and control to include holding a majority 
of voting shares or “otherwise exercising an equivalent degree of control”). The law of 
foreign sovereign immunity protects such entities, as well as their political subdivisions, 
agencies, and instrumentalities. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
 50. Some aspects of the discussion to follow can usefully be applied to other entities. 
For example, states routinely hold minority interests in entities, either directly or through 
state-controlled entities such as sovereign wealth funds. See, e.g., MUSACCHIO & LAZZARINI, 
supra note 25, at 47–50. As sovereigns, these state owners are entitled (at least presumptively) 
to sovereign immunity. 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 1603. 
 52. See infra Section I.B.2.b. 
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subsidiaries may be able to assert sovereign immunity as a defense 
to legal proceedings in the United States. Subsidiaries organized 
under U.S. law cannot. 53 Although I reserve detailed discussion for 
later, the figure below depicts these relationships (in grossly 




A. Organizational Law When the Owner Is (and Is Not) a Sovereign 
Limited liability entities shield owners’ assets from claims 
asserted by the entity’s creditors.54 The entity, in turn, is protected 
from claims asserted by creditors of its owners.55 The decision to 
pierce the corporate veil withdraws these protections. To 
understand when it makes sense to do this, one must first 
understand why asset partitioning matters in the first place.56 Only 
then can we decide whether doctrine developed in the traditional 
corporate context can sensibly be applied to state-owned entities. 
 
 53. An agency or instrumentality must be “neither a citizen of a State of the United 
States . . . nor created under the laws of any third country.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3). 
 54. Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2006). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 487 (“The extent to which one believes courts should 
invoke the veil piercing remedy . . . depends in the first instance on one’s assessment of the 
policy merits of limited liability itself.”); Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
89, 91 (2013) (“[V]eil piercing is justified potentially only when limited liability is not.”). 
Venezuela
PDVSA








less so) by sovereign 
immunity







less so) by sovereign 
immunity
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1. Owner and entity shielding in the traditional setting 
I keep the discussion in this Section brief, in recognition of the 
fact that much ink has already been spilled on the functions of 
organizational law in general and on veil piercing in particular.57 I 
begin with the owner-shielding aspects of organizational law, best 
exemplified by the rule that shareholders are not personally liable 
for corporate debts unless their own conduct provides a basis for 
liability.58 The usual justification for the rule runs something like 
this: limited liability reduces monitoring costs and the cost of firm 
governance,59 enables investor diversification,60 increases 
liquidity,61 and (hopefully) encourages an appropriate level of risk-
taking by firms engaged in economic activity.62 
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to elaborate on these 
claims, but a brief example may illustrate.63 Consider the 
 
 57. For just a few examples, see Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 99; Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 3, at 401; Hansmann et al., supra note 54, at 1352; Bainbridge, supra 
note 14; Alexander, supra note 4, at 391; Oh, supra note 56, at 91; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing 
the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1058 (1991); Christina L. Boyd 
& David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2010); and Blair, 
supra note 5, at 391. 
 58. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
 59. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 424–25; Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 490. 
 60. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 490. 
 61. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
 62. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Commentary, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: 
Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 164 (1992) (linking limited 
liability to the desire to promote entrepreneurial activity). We might add a variety of 
procedural and other concerns that underpin the limited liability rule. See, e.g., Alexander, 
supra note 4 (exploring procedural barriers to the expansion of shareholder liability); Poonam 
Puri, Judgment Proofing the Profession, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 21 (2001) (describing 
evolution of veil piercing as an exception to the rule of limited liability for shareholders). 
 63. Much (though by no means all) corporate law theory embraces the so-called 
nexus-of-contracts model, which views firms as webs of implicit contracts between groups 
of claimants with competing interests in the firm’s earnings. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 
14; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 1–39; Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and 
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 (1991); William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of 
Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989). For present 
purposes, one need not embrace the nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation, which 
despite its prominence has attracted criticism. See, e.g., Bratton, supra, at 410 (arguing that the 
nexus-of-contracts model “suffers from a single-mindedness of its own, and, as a result, fails 
to offer a viable contractual theory of the corporation”). It is only necessary to realize that the 
owner- and entity-shielding consequences of incorporation are less relevant to sovereign 
states, and to accept that veil piercing doctrine should be informed by the purposes of 
organizational law in this setting. 
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relationship between shareholders and voluntary creditors of a 
publicly held corporation. The shareholders lack the inclination, 
expertise, and ability to monitor corporate managers or the 
solvency of other shareholders (who, absent limited liability, will 
be jointly liable for corporate debts). For them, unlimited liability 
creates risks that cannot be effectively mitigated; they will therefore 
favor the limited liability rule.64 For creditors, it is a closer call, but 
it is not obvious that they would prefer a rule of unlimited liability 
given the cost of pursuing claims against dispersed investors.65  
At least arguably, then, these parties would contract for the limited 
liability rule, if it were necessary and feasible to contract. 
Similar justifications support the entity-shielding aspects of 
organizational law. For instance, because creditors of a corporation 
have priority claims to firm assets, they need not concern 
themselves with monitoring the solvency of shareholders.66 By 
contrast, if a shareholder’s creditors could force a liquidation of 
corporate assets, a prospective transaction partner would struggle 
to assess the risk of dealing with the corporation: “Intimate 
familiarity with the firm’s own assets and business affairs would 
not suffice to determine the firm’s creditworthiness; knowledge of 
the personal creditworthiness of each of the firm’s owners would 
be necessary as well.”67 Arguably, this entity-shielding function of 
organizational law is most important, for it would be difficult or 
impossible to replicate by contract.68 
Veil piercing is a de-partitioning remedy.69 One would think, 
therefore, that courts would pierce the corporate veil only after 
deciding that it is no longer appropriate to respect the boundaries 
between the entity and its owners (or between the entity and its 
various subsidiaries).70 At first glance, however, the law of veil 
piercing is in some disarray. In general, courts pierce the corporate 
veil when the owner exercises complete domination over the 
corporation and uses that control to perpetrate a fraud or injustice 
 
 64. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 424; Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 492. 
 65. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 492–94. 
 66. Id. at 492–93. 
 67. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 402–03.  
 68. Id. at 432; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 54, at 1340–41. 
 69. Hansmann & Squire, supra note 10, at 1. 
 70. Oh, supra note 56, at 91 (“[V]eil-piercing is justified potentially only when limited 
liability is not.”). 
3.WEIDEMAIER_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/27/2021  1:47 AM 
811 Piercing the (Sovereign) Veil  
 811 
 
(as when a shareholder leaves other creditors in the lurch by 
siphoning away corporate assets).71 On occasion, the two parts of 
this test are phrased disjunctively, so that a creditor may pierce the 
veil upon showing either that the owner extensively dominated the 
corporation or that the owner used the corporate form to perpetrate 
fraud.72 The former theory—extensive domination and control— 
is sometimes called “alter ego” liability.73 As implemented, 
however, courts generally invoke the alter ego theory to pierce the 
veil only when the owner’s domination “leads to a wrong against  
third parties.”74 
In practice, courts often analyze veil piercing questions  
by invoking a laundry list of factors. These include (among  
many others)75: 
• undercapitalization 
• commingling of corporate and personal assets 
• failure to observe corporate formalities 
• failure to pay dividends 
• siphoning of corporate funds 
• failure to keep corporate records 
• the corporation’s payment of the shareholder’s 
personal obligations, and 
• the shareholder’s use of the corporate form to pursue 
personal objectives 
Many of these factors have no obvious connection to the reasons 
why the law might (or might not) respect the corporate form.76 It is 
not obvious, for example, why it advances the underlying purposes 
of the law to impose personal liability on a shareholder who has 
 
 71. PRESSER, supra note 5. 
 72. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24  
(2d Cir. 1993); Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. 
v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., 909 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 73. Itel Containers, 909 F.2d at 703. 
 74. Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Devs. S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138  
(2d Cir. 1991). 
 75. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate 
Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 379 (1999). 
 76. Oh, supra note 56, at 90. 
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failed to observe corporate formalities.77 Thus, it is perhaps no 
surprise that the law of veil piercing has been criticized as 
incoherent.78 But this does not necessarily mean there is no order in 
the cases. Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts, for instance, assert that 
courts pierce the veil in three categories of cases: to further 
statutory or regulatory goals (such as those relating to 
environmental law), to prevent shareholders from obtaining credit 
by misrepresentation, and to promote bankruptcy-type values (as 
by preventing shareholders from transferring corporate assets to 
themselves, thus elevating themselves over higher priority 
creditors).79 For present purposes, readers need not accept that veil 
piercing cases can be rationally sorted according to this typology.80 
The important point is that efforts to make sense of veil piercing 
doctrine reflect the (sensible) view that courts should pierce the veil 
only “to achieve discrete, specific policy objectives.”81  
 
 77. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 511–12; Milton, supra note 14, at 1335–36; Macey 
& Mitts, supra note 6, at 109 (“[P]iercing the corporate veil for failing to observe corporate 
formalities . . . makes no sense. It is like imposing liability on a person because he did not 
wear a tie or keep a napkin in his lap while eating.”). 
 78. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,  
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985) (referring to the law of veil piercing as “severe, and 
unprincipled”); Frederick Tung, Limited Liability and Creditors’ Rights: The Limits of Risk 
Shifting to Creditors, 34 GA. L. REV. 547, 568 (2000) (criticizing veil piercing doctrine as vague); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between Form and 
Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109, 113 (2004) (calling veil piercing doctrine “conceptually 
confusing”); Oh, supra note 56, at 90 (referring to the law of veil piercing as an  
“abysmal failure”). 
 79. See Macey & Mitts, supra note 6. 
 80. For example, Macy and Mitts rely on automated text analysis of judicial opinions, 
which accompany only a small minority of judicial actions. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Alan 
J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
681, 710 (2007); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, 
Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 165 
(2006). Moreover, judicial opinions do not necessarily reveal the actual reasons for a decision; 
they do not “tell us what went on in judges’ minds,” but do reveal “what judges think is 
legitimate argument and legitimate authority, justifying their behavior.” Lawrence M. 
Friedman, Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright & Stanton Wheeler, State Supreme Courts:  
A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 794 (1981). Thus, Christina Boyd and 
David Hoffman criticize much veil piercing scholarship for placing too much reliance on 
“how judges justify themselves,” leading critics to paint a caricature of veil piercing doctrine 
that “predict[s] the iceberg by its odd, biased tip.” Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, 
Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 855 (2010). Boyd and Hoffman’s work 
identifies other, often non legal, factors associated with the decision to pierce the  
corporate veil. 
 81. Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 100–01. 
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Put differently, one should disregard an entity’s separate legal 
status only when the reasons for respecting it are absent. Of course, 
this requires an understanding of why separate legal status matters 
in the first place. For state-owned entities, it is not clear that such 
an understanding exists. 
2. Bancec’s incomplete case for entity shielding in the sovereign context 
In the seminal Bancec case, the Supreme Court held that when 
“government instrumentalities [are] established as juridical entities 
distinct and independent from their sovereign [they] should 
normally be treated as such.”82 Invoking principles “common to 
international law and federal common law,”83 Bancec made clear 
that U.S. courts must respect the separate legal status of entities 
owned by foreign sovereigns except when the “entity is so 
extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal 
and agent is created” or when respecting the entity’s separate legal 
status “would work fraud or injustice.”84 Though derived from a 
different source—organizational law is typically state law—this 
formulation does not distinguish state-owned from other entities. 
The Bancec majority did not try to articulate clear rules for 
determining when to disregard the separate legal status of  
state-owned entities. It did, however, offer a preliminary 
justification for its willingness to indulge the fiction of separate 
legal personhood in this context. To understand the limits of its 
reasoning, it will help to keep in mind that Bancec was a “reverse” 
veil piercing case, which implicated the entity shielding functions 
of organizational law. The question was whether a U.S. bank with 
an expropriation claim against the Cuban government could assert 
this claim as a set-off in an action brought by a legally separate, 
state-owned entity.85 Bancec did not involve an attempt to reach 
government assets by a creditor of a state-owned entity.86 
In explaining its decision, the Bancec majority invoked 
principles that would be familiar to any student of corporate law. 
 
 82. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 626–27 (1983). 
 83. Id. at 613. 
 84. Id. at 629. See also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 822 (2018). 
 85. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 613–14. 
 86. Such an attempt would match the traditional veil piercing scenario and implicate 
the owner-shielding functions of limited liability. 
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For instance, the majority emphasized that entity shielding 
facilitates access to credit for state-owned corporations: 
Freely ignoring the separate status of government 
instrumentalities would result in substantial uncertainty over 
whether an instrumentality’s assets would be diverted to satisfy a 
claim against the sovereign, and might thereby cause third parties 
to hesitate before extending credit to a government 
instrumentality without the government’s guarantee.87 
This reasoning would not be out of place in a modern 
discussion of the benefits of limited liability in a corporation with 
non-sovereign shareholders. In both sovereign and non-sovereign 
settings, entity shielding lets prospective creditors transact with the 
entity without monitoring the solvency of its owners.88 Bancec’s 
reasoning likewise provides a reason to respect the separate legal 
status of affiliated entities within one state-controlled firm.89 Here, 
too, the Court’s opinion would not be out of place in a modern 
discussion of the benefits of complex corporate structures involving 
non-sovereign shareholders.90 It bears repeating, however, that 
Bancec was discussing the benefits of entity shielding—i.e., 
insulating firm assets from claims by creditors of the shareholder. 
The majority’s reasoning provides no explicit justification for owner 
shielding—i.e., insulating owners from claims by creditors of the 
firm. I return to this important distinction shortly.91 
 
 87. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626. 
 88. See De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that 
imposing a government shareholder’s liabilities on a state-owned corporation would create 
risks for lenders and other “unsuspecting third parties”); Bank of N.Y. v. Yugoimport,  
745 F.3d 599, 614 n.14 (2d. Cir. 2014) (“In the case of a developing country, diversion of an 
instrumentality’s assets to satisfy debts of the sovereign could stymie investment and cause 
third-parties dealing with the instrumentality to demand government guarantees.”); 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 402 (noting that, but for the entity shielding function 
of organizational law, “creditors of any single owner would have the right to proceed against 
that owner’s share of the firm’s assets in case of the individual’s insolvency”). 
 89. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29 (1976) (“Section 1610(b) will not permit execution 
against the property of one agency or instrumentality to satisfy a judgment against another, 
unrelated agency or instrumentality.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and 
Creditors’ Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L. J. 2680 (2015) (characterizing complex corporate 
groups as designed to allow efficient creditor monitoring, including the ability to select 
between project-specific and firm-wide enforcement). 
 91. See infra Section I.B.2.b. 
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To be sure, the Bancec majority opinion also highlights 
considerations unique to, or more acutely raised by, state-owned 
entities. “[P]rinciples of comity,” the majority noted, also justify the 
presumption of independence afforded to state-owned entities.92 
Quoting the authoritative House Report on the FSIA, the Court 
posited that a U.S. court’s refusal to respect the separate legal status 
of a state-owned entity “might encourage foreign jurisdictions to 
disregard the juridical divisions between different U.S. 
corporations or between a U.S. corporation and its independent 
subsidiary.”93 To a degree, this concern is implicated whenever a 
U.S. court is faced with any entity organized under the law of a 
foreign state, but it is especially acute when the foreign state is  
the owner. 
The concern for comity also suggests a justification for 
extending the owner-shielding aspects of limited liability to foreign 
sovereigns. Perhaps U.S. courts should protect the sovereign’s 
assets from creditors of a state-owned entity to avoid creating 
diplomatic headaches and to encourage foreign jurisdictions to 
reciprocate by protecting owners of U.S. entities, whether or not 
owned by the federal government. That is a primary concern 
animating the law of foreign sovereign immunity;94 it might also 
justify extending owner shielding to foreign sovereigns. Indeed, 
after Bancec, courts faced with traditional veil piercing questions 
have invoked comity to justify the presumption that state-owned 
entities are separate from their owners.95 In the main, however, 
 
 92. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626. The majority referenced the authoritative House Report 
accompanying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which expressed the concern 
that “[i]f U.S. law did not respect the separate juridical identities of different agencies or 
instrumentalities, it might encourage foreign jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions 
between different U.S. corporations or between a U.S. corporation and its independent 
subsidiary.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29–30 (1976). 
 93. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 627–28 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29–30 (1976), as 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1976, 6628–29). 
 94. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004). 
 95. DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Hond., 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 209 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting, in 
an action to enforce against the government an arbitration award against a state 
instrumentality, that the presumption of separateness is “rooted in principles of comity”); 
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009) (deciding whether to impute conduct by 
a U.S. Archdiocese to the Holy See and noting Bancec’s concern for comity). 
3.WEIDEMAIER_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/27/2021  1:47 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:3 (2021) 
816 
 
courts have not offered clear justifications for owner shielding in 
the context of state-owned entities.96 
3. Importing organizational law (mostly) wholesale into the  
sovereign context 
Bancec left to lower courts the work of fashioning rules for 
disregarding the separate legal status of state-owned entities. As 
noted, Bancec also implicated the entity-shielding, not the owner-
shielding, attributes of organizational law. Yet lower courts have 
not distinguished between these scenarios.97 In both contexts, 
moreover, courts have largely imported the law developed in the 
context of “ordinary” limited liability entities. Thus, in deciding 
whether a corporation is the “alter ego” or agent of a foreign state, 
courts have invoked a familiar laundry list of factors, including 
whether the state: 
(1) uses the instrumentality’s property as its own; (2) ignores the 
instrumentality’s separate status or ordinary corporate 
formalities; (3) deprives the instrumentality of the independence 
from close political control that is generally enjoyed by 
government agencies; (4) requires the instrumentality to obtain 
approvals for ordinary business decisions from a political actor; 
and (5) issues policies or directives that cause the instrumentality 
to act directly on behalf of the sovereign state.98 
 
 96. Again, I do not suggest that considerations of comity and reciprocity can provide 
a principled basis for veil piercing decisions. See supra note 20. At most, they represent  
a thumb on the scale. As a descriptive matter, it is fair to say that such concerns  
partially explain the general reluctance of U.S. courts to pierce the veil of entities owned by 
foreign states. 
 97. See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Republic of Venez., 200 F.3d 843, 847–48 
(D.C. Cir. 2000). On rare occasions, courts suggest that different policies might be at stake in 
the two contexts, but they have not elaborated on the differences. Bayer & Willis, Inc. v. 
Republic of Gambia, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 98. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 830 F.3d 107, 130 (2d. Cir. 2016); 
EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 91 (2d. Cir. 2015). 
Conceptually, there is a difference between calling an entity the “alter ego” of its owner—in 
the sense that the owner so completely dominates the entity that “they act as one”—and 
treating the entity as its owner’s agent. See Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 848. The latter 
relationship generally turns on principles of agency law, which overlap only barely with the 
“control” factors listed above. See id. at 849. The cases, however, often collapse the inquiry 
into one, omnibus inquiry into the extent of the state’s control over the entity.  
See, e.g., id. at 848. 
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As in the context of non-sovereign owners, courts rarely pause 
to explain why the decision whether to respect an entity’s separate 
legal status should turn on any of these factors. To the contrary, 
outcomes appear to turn on relatively minor distinctions, which 
supposedly illuminate the extent to which the state controlled the 
entity’s day-to-day operations.99   
As an example, in Transamerica, the DC Circuit declined to 
pierce the corporate veil between Venezuela and a state-owned 
shipping company. It distinguished a prior case, Foremost-
McKesson, primarily by noting that, in the earlier case, the 
government had “directly controlled [r]outine business decisions, 
such as declaring and paying dividends . . . and honoring the 
[corporation’s] contractual commitments.”100 In Transamerica, by 
contrast, there was little evidence that the state did more than use 
its influence over the board of directors to install its preferred 
managerial team to address the firm’s operational difficulties.101 In 
another case, Kalamazoo Spice, a district judge disregarded the 
separate legal status of a state-owned corporation, explaining the 
result by noting, among other indicia of control, that a government 
ministry had been required to approve all invoices over $13,000 and 
that all checks above $25,000 had to be signed by a member of the 
board of directors appointed by the government.102 
Recall that Bancec allows courts to disregard the separate legal 
status of a state-owned entity when the entity and its owner are 
“alter egos” or when a contrary decision “would work fraud  
 
 99. See, e.g., Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Phil., 965 F.2d 1375,  
1382–83 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing importance of day-to-day control); Kirschenbaum, 830 
F.3d at 130 (dismissing state’s extensive control over corporation as not enough to show 
“day-to-day” control); First Inv. Corp. of Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, 
Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 753 (5th Cir. 2012) (looking to “the ownership and management structure 
of the instrumentality, paying particularly close attention to whether the government is 
involved in day-to-day operations, as well as the extent to which the agent holds itself out to 
be acting on behalf of the government”) (quoting Walter Fuller, 965 F.2d at 1381); Holy See, 
557 F.3d at 1080 (interpreting Bancec to require an inquiry into “day-to-day control’’). 
 100. Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted) (also emphasizing 
that the corporation had “acted to effectuate a governmental policy” intended to injure the 
corporation’s foreign shareholders). 
 101. See id. at 851; see also id. at 853 (noting that other than “the government’s ownership 
of stock and control of the Board of Directors, this case bears no resemblance to McKesson”). 
 102. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist Ethiopia, 
616 F. Supp. 660, 666 (W.D. Mich. 1985). 
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or injustice.”103 When evaluating the risk of “fraud or injustice,” 
courts have again invoked familiar considerations, asking, for 
example, whether the sovereign has siphoned assets or otherwise 
manipulated the corporate form to thwart creditors of the 
corporation.104 And on occasion, they insist that the injustice result 
from misuse of the corporate form, rather than from the exercise of 
regulatory or other powers, apparently regardless of the 
sovereign’s motivation.105 
In Bridas v. Government of Turkmenistan, for instance, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed an arbitration award obtained by an Argentinian 
company (Bridas) against the Government of Turkmenistan.106 
Bridas had entered into a joint venture with an entity owned by 
Turkmenistan to exploit oil and gas reserves located in that 
country.107 Thereafter, the government ordered Bridas to suspend 
operations and imposed an import/export ban that prevented 
further work.108 Although the government’s motive was to increase 
“its share of future proceeds” and to “force Bridas’s submission,” 
the Fifth Circuit treated the export ban as irrelevant: 
The Government’s exercise of its sovereign powers may have 
constituted a wrong to Bridas, but it was not a wrong based on 
misuse of the corporate organizational form . . . [T]he . . . export 
ban is not a “fraud or injustice” for alter ego purposes.109 
Instead, the court based its decision on the fact that the 
government had dissolved the state-owned counterparty to the 
joint venture, replacing it with a thinly capitalized entity funded by 
 
 103. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,  
629 (1983). 
 104. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 447 F.3d 411, 416–20 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 105. Id. at 417. 
 106. Id. at 420. 
 107. Id. at 414. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 415, 417. Note that the Bridas opinion arguably implies that the Bancec test is 
conjunctive, requiring both extensive domination and “fraud or injustice.” However, 
appealing this understanding, it is hard to square with the Bancec opinion and with later 
Supreme Court cases, which treat the “fraud or injustice” test as an independent basis for 
disregarding the corporate form. Either way, courts in both the sovereign and non-sovereign 
contexts generally do not impose alter ego liability unless some identifiable harm results 
from the owner’s domination of the entity. See supra text accompanying note 74; Crystallex 
Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126, 141–43 (3d Cir. 2019) (rejecting the 
need to find a nexus between the foreign state’s control of the entity and the creditor’s injury). 
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assets that were placed out of reach of the entity’s creditors.110  
Only such “misuse” of the corporate form, and not the exercise  
of “sovereign powers,” could constitute a fraud or injustice  
under Bancec.111 
I do not necessarily object to the result in any of these cases.112 
In Kalamazoo Spice, for example, an investor who had been majority 
owner of an Ethiopian corporation sued the government, which 
had expropriated the plaintiff’s interest. Believing the government 
could not be sued unless it had minimum contacts with the United 
States, the court considered whether the expropriated corporation’s 
contacts with the United States could be imputed to the 
government under an alter ego or agency theory.113 It is easy to see 
the argument for doing so, and equally easy to square the result 
with the objectives underlying the law of sovereign immunity 
(discussed below).114 Put simply: the government induced private 
investors to take an equity stake, the value of which derived largely 
from the corporation’s ability to conduct commercial activities 
abroad. Having expropriated that stake, the government’s 
argument implied that the corporation could continue to do 
business in the United States without exposing its assets to 
collection efforts by the plaintiff. So understood, preserving the 
fiction of separate corporate personhood would “insulate [the 
 
 110. Bridas, 447 F.3d at 417. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Appropriately, courts often focus on whether the foreign state has used the entity 
to defraud creditors or obtain credit by false pretenses. See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc. 
v. Republic of Venez., 200 F.3d 843, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding no fraud or injustice where 
the government “did not manipulate [the corporation] in order to obtain a financial benefit 
from the plaintiffs before [the corporation] went bankrupt”); EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la 
República Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 96 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that the plaintiffs had not shown 
that the country used the central bank “to frustrate the collection efforts of its creditors,” as 
by transferring government assets to the central bank in an effort to shelter them from 
creditor enforcement efforts). 
 113. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist Ethiopia, 
616 F. Supp. 660, 666 (W.D. Mich. 1985). Although the Supreme Court has not definitively 
ruled on the question, most courts hold that foreign states are not persons for due process 
purposes and are not entitled to litigation-related constitutional protections. See, e.g., 
Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399–400 
(2d Cir. 2009); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95–100 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). Among the consequences of this treatment is that the state cannot object to the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts on the basis of a lack of minimum contacts. See, e.g., Price, 294 
F.3d at 95–100. For a critique of this position, see Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other 
Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019). 
 114. See infra Section I.B. 
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government] from liability for expropriation . . . while permitting 
[it] . . . to profit from its commercial activities in the US . . . .”115 
But while the result is sensible, the problem is that the 
explanation focuses largely on trivial concerns with no obvious 
relevance to any policy objective. Indeed, subsequent cases reduce 
Kalamazoo Spice to its quotidian details, distinguishing it not 
because it involved what amounted to fraud, but because of the 
extensive day-to-day control supposedly exercised by the 
government: in Kalamazoo Spice, you see, the government approved 
the checks.116 
At one level, my criticism echoes those leveled against veil 
piercing doctrine in the usual (non-sovereign) context. There, 
observers often describe veil piercing doctrine as incoherent,117 
emphasizing that many veil piercing factors, especially those 
related to control, have “no logical link or nexus” to any policy 
reason for piercing the veil.118 In the sovereign context, however, 
the concern runs somewhat deeper. Recall that, in the traditional 
context, the alter ego theory lets a court pierce the veil upon finding 
that the owner dominated the entity, without any specific reason to 
think the owner’s conduct harmed any third party or subverted any 
important legal policy.119 But in practice, courts tend to pierce the 
veil only when the owner’s domination plausibly results in some 
harm or wrongdoing.120 In the sovereign context, the alter ego 
decisions do not always link the state’s control to any policy 
justification for veil piercing. To be sure, in some cases, such as 
Kalamazoo Spice, the facts reveal such a justification, even if it does 
not feature prominently in the court’s opinion.121 In others, the 
foreign state is treated as the entity’s alter ego based solely on a 
 
 115. Kalamazoo Spice, 616 F. Supp. at 666. 
 116. See, e.g., General Star National Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 713 
F. Supp. 2d 267, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (distinguishing Kalamazoo Spice, not as a case involving 
fraud, but as a case where “all checks above a certain amount were signed by [a] government 
official and all orders above a certain amount were subject to government approval”). 
 117. See supra note 78. 
 118. Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 109. 
 119. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 120. Supra note 34. 
 121. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
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finding of extensive control over the entity’s operations.122 
Especially in these cases, where control produces no obvious harm 
to creditors, there is a risk that veil piercing doctrine will become 
unmoored from any relevant policy objective. 
B.  Why Ownership? And What Does Organizational Law Do  
for Sovereigns? 
The discussion to follow examines why organizational law 
matters for sovereign states and state-owned entities. That 
discussion requires answers to two fundamental questions. First, 
why do sovereign states own controlling interests in corporations 
and similar entities? Second, what work does organizational law do 
for these entities and their sovereign owners? Put differently, what 
happens when we disregard the separate legal personhood of an 
entity owned by a sovereign state? 
1. The tenuous link between ownership and control 
More than ten percent of the world’s largest firms are state 
owned.123 These firms control more than 330,000 domestic and 
foreign subsidiaries across a wide range of economic sectors, from 
natural resource extraction, to arms manufacturing, to 
telecommunications, to financial intermediation.124 The sheer 
number and diversity of such firms implies that there is no simple 
explanation for the fact of state ownership, and I do not offer one 
here.125 For present purposes, an incomplete answer will suffice: 
 
 122. See supra note 36; see also Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 
333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 399 (D. Del. 2019) (basing alter ego ruling solely on the foreign state’s 
extensive control over the entity). 
 123. Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska & Matias Egeland,  
State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications 9 (OECD Trade Pol’y Papers,  
Policy Paper No. 147, 2013), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/state-owned-
enterprises_5k4869ckqk7l-en; Poonam Puri, Sovereign Veil Piercing at 9 (Feb. 9, 2016 draft on 
file with author). 
 124. Kowalski et al., supra note 123, at 6. 
 125. There are many explanations for the prevalence of state ownership and many 
different models of state capitalism. For background, see MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI,  
supra note 25, at 57–78. For example, a government may deem ownership necessary to correct 
for market failures when private markets do not supply goods and services at optimal levels. 
Kowalski et al., supra note 123; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 48, at 20. This is a 
classic justification offered for government provision of water and sewage services, for 
example. See MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI, supra note 25, at 23–24. 
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Compared to private investors, governments more often view firms 
as vehicles for achieving political, economic, and social objectives 
unrelated to profit maximization.126 And governments tend to own 
firms, at least in part, because they value the tools of corporate 
control in achieving these objectives.127 However, states have many 
other levers of control, including the ability to tax and impose 
regulatory obligations. This complicates any attempt to predicate 
veil piercing on a finding of owner “domination.”128 Governments 
may be deeply involved as owners without implicating any policy 
relevant to organizational law. By contrast, governments may use 
“sovereign powers” to accomplish goals that undermine 
organizational law’s traditional objectives.129 
Begin with the first point: that governments view ownership, 
and ownership rights, as tools for pursuing policy objectives. This 
is of course a generalization. Patterns of state ownership have 
evolved dramatically.130 In recent decades, many state-owned 
entities have embraced improved—or at least more corporatized—
governance, with less hands-on management by political actors.131 
Political, economic, and ideological considerations also impact 
models of state ownership.132 From a governance perspective, there 
 
 126. MARY SHIRLEY & JOHN NELLIS, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE REFORM: THE LESSONS OF 
EXPERIENCE 16–18 (1991); State-Owned Enterprises: Catalysts for Public Value Creation?, PWC 20 
(Apr. 2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/publications/assets/pwc-state-owned-
enterprise-psrc.pdf. 
 127. Of course, governments may have an ideological preference for state ownership, 
see, e.g., MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI, supra note 25, at 30, or may see ownership as necessary 
to ensure the optimal provision of public goods. But this is just to restate the broader point, 
which is that the state views the firm as a tool for achieving policy objectives, and ownership 
rights as a desirable lever of control over firm behavior. 
 128. See Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1982). 
 129. To a degree, these observations also apply to entities with non-sovereign owners. 
There is no necessary link between the extent of a shareholder’s control, or the observance of 
corporate formalities, and the policies of organizational law. See Macey & Mitts, supra note 
6, at 109–10. Moreover, in closely held corporations (where veil piercing is most likely), 
shareholders also may exploit social standing, family status, or other sources of authority to 
direct corporate behavior. Sovereigns, however, have more, and more powerful, levers of 
control. Their use of these levers also raises unique concerns that implicate relations between 
sovereign states. 
 130. See MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI, supra note 25, at 23–56. 
 131. Id. at 281–82; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE 
GOVERNANCE REFORM: AN INVENTORY OF RECENT CHANGE 10–30 (2011) (summarizing 
developments in governance practices with regard to state owned firms). 
 132.  ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 131 (summarizing developments in 
governance practices with regard to state owned firms). 
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are stark differences between, say, a firm whose managers answer 
directly to political actors, a firm in which multiple governance tiers 
or layers of state bureaucracy buffer managers from political 
pressure,133 and a firm in which private investors hold a minority 
stake.134 And of course there are some state-owned entities, such as 
sovereign wealth funds, where profit maximization will be a more 
pronounced concern. 
Despite this variance, sovereigns differ from other owners in 
that they have more, and different, reasons to intervene in the 
entity’s affairs.135 To be sure, state-owned entities may enjoy more 
independence than government agencies.136 But states nevertheless 
exert substantial control, often far in excess of that we might expect 
even from a controlling shareholder in a close corporation. Even 
when they act like commercial enterprises in other respects, state-
owned firms may be asked to pursue objectives that are “non-
economic, inconsistent, and frequently changing.”137 For example, 
some state-owned firms prioritize creating employment 
opportunities in poor regions.138 Less benignly, governments might 
also view state-owned enterprises as vehicles for dispensing jobs or 
 
 133. Ian Thynne, Ownership as an Instrument of Policy and Understanding in the Public 
Sphere: Trends and Research Agenda, 32 POL’Y STUD. 183, 188 (2011). 
 134. See, e.g., Marta Nogueira, Petrobas Respects Minority Shareholders Again:  
Board Member, REUTERS (July 24, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
petrobras-shareholders/petrobras-respects-minority-shareholders-again-board-member-
idUSKBN1A921H. For firms in which some portion of ownership stake is privately held, also 
consider the impact of the decision to list shares on a stock exchange whose rules impose 
disclosure requirements and constrain corporate governance. See Hans Christiansen & Alissa 
Koldertsova, The Role of Stock Exchanges in Corporate Governance (OECD, Working Paper No. 
2009/1, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384059. 
 135. See remarks by Jane Chalmers, Attribution Issues in State Responsibility, 84 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 51, 63 (1990) (noting that state investment decisions have motivations 
beyond “entrepreneurial risk analysis. . . . [P]articularly political motivations which may be 
at odds with the profit motive”). 
 136. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 624–25 (1982). In fact, managers of state-owned firms may 
occasionally have more discretion than is true for other firms, as there is no market for 
corporate shares and civil servants responsible for monitoring managers may have weak 
incentives to do so. Saul Estrin, State Ownership, Corporate Governance and Privatization, in 
OECD PROCEEDINGS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, AND 
PRIVATIZATION 11, 15 (1998). Yet the desire to align the entity with political objectives creates 
a tendency for government actors to intervene frequently in the management of state-owned 
firms. Id. at 16. 
 137. Estrin, supra note 136, at 17. 
 138. See SHIRLEY & NELLIS, supra note 126, at 17. 
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other benefits to supporters of ruling elites,139 or simply to ensure a 
close correspondence between the firm’s activities and the policy 
preferences of government officials.140 
The control rights attendant to ownership are one mechanism 
through which the state ensures that the entity pursues its desired 
objectives.141 Yet governments do not need ownership rights to 
assert control.142 Saudi Aramco, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s 
state-owned oil company, built a multi-million dollar complex 
favored by the royal family, complete with mosque, children’s 
camp, museum, and staging ground for a camel beauty contest.143 
Was this because the Kingdom is Saudi Aramco’s owner? Its 
regulator? Its largest and most important customer?144 
In Venezuela, PDVSA enjoys a monopoly on oil and gas 
exploitation and has historically generated 95% of the 
government’s foreign currency.145 It also has transferred billions of 
dollars annually to the government. In 2008, for instance, PDVSA 
paid $2 billion in dividends to the government (as shareholder).146 
But that is a pittance compared to the $14.7 billion it paid in 
 
 139. See, e.g., Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Theory of 
Privatization, 106 ECON. J. 309, 309–10 (1996). 
 140. Muiris MacCarthaigh, Managing State-Owned Enterprises in an Age of Crisis:  
An Analysis of the Irish Experience, 32 POL’Y STUD. 215, 217 (2011) (“[P]atronage appointments 
by governments to the boards of SOEs have traditionally ensured a direct form of 
accountability in relation to policy decisions.”). 
 141. Thynne, supra note 133, at 184. To an extent, of course, it depends on the baseline. 
For instance, governments accustomed to funding and delivering goods and services 
through political departments or agencies might view the creation of a state-owned entity as 
an intermediate step towards full privatization. Id. at 187. I am referring here to entities in 
which governments plan to retain a controlling ownership stake. 
 142. Again, this is true, although to a lesser extent, of non-sovereign owners.  
For instance, a shareholder may also be a customer of the corporation, and it may use its 
influence as a customer to influence corporate behavior. See also MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI, 
supra note 25, at 23–56. 
 143. Justin Scheck, Bradley Hope & Summer Said, Saudi Aramco Struggles to Disengage 
from Royal Family’s Whims, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2017, 12:12 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-want-saudi-aramco-to-untangle-itself-from-
saudi-arabiait-wont-be-easy-1495725735. 
 144. Matt Levine, Aramco Now Comes with Some Numbers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2018, 
8:28 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-13/aramco-now-comes-
with-some-numbers. 
 145. Keith Johnson, How Venezuela Struck it Poor, FOREIGN POL’Y  
(July 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/16/how-venezuela-struck-it-
poor-oil-energy-chavez. 
 146. See PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZ., S.A., LISTING PARTICULARS 42 (2011). 
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mandatory “contributions” to various social programs pursuant to 
Venezuelan law.147 PDVSA has also provided gas domestically at 
exceptionally low prices set by the government.148 It continued 
these transfers to the government even as its finances fell into 
disrepair and, eventually, it defaulted on billions worth of 
obligations to creditors.149 
If courts pierce the veil when dividends allow a shareholder to 
“systematically withdraw capital . . . without regard to the needs of 
the business,”150 should it matter that Venezuela largely eschewed 
dividends in favor of subsidized gas and “contributions” to social 
programs? If courts view owner domination as a sufficient basis for 
veil piercing, what do we make of the fact that, in 2017, the 
Venezuelan government arrested senior executives and board 
members of CITGO, PDVSA’s U.S. subsidiary, on politically-
motivated corruption charges?151 That is one way to dominate a 
corporation, although one that formally results from the exercise of 
“sovereign powers”152 rather than corporate control rights.153 
I return to these questions below. For now, I note only that, even 
when the owner is not a sovereign, it is not obvious why owner 
domination matters unless the owner uses its power to achieve an 
objective that organizational law seeks to prevent.154 In the 
dividend “milking” example, for instance, a shareholder uses 
control over the corporation to elevate itself in priority over the 
 
 147. Id. at 47. 
 148. As of July 2018, gas was priced domestically at roughly $0.04 per gallon. See 
Johnson, supra note 145. 
 149. William Neuman & Clifford Krauss, Workers Flee and Thieves Loot Venezuela’s 
Reeling Oil Giant, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/06/14/world/americas/venezuela-oil-economy.html. 
 150. PRESSER, supra note 5, at § 1.8; see also Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enter., 
397 F.3d 1217, 1231 n.14 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Piercing . . . based on ‘milking’ of ‘excessive 
dividends’ makes sense . . . where corporate assets are systematically and extensively 
removed from the corporation.”). 
 151. Kirk Semple & Clifford Krauss, Politics Shadow Arrests of Citgo Executives in 
Venezuela Graft Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/11/22/world/americas/venezuela-citgo-oil-arrests-corruption.html. 
 152. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 447 F.3d 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2006). Again, the 
Bridas court dismissed the exercise of “sovereign powers” as irrelevant to Bancec’s fraud or 
injustice test, not to the issue of control. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 153. At least one creditor has argued that these facts warrant treating CITGO Petroleum 
as the government’s alter ego. See Complaint at 23, OI Eur. Grp. B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venez. (D. Del., 2019), (No. 1:19-cv-00290-LPS). 
 154. Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 108. 
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entity’s creditors.155 In cases like this, it is the forbidden objective 
that justifies veil piercing; control over the corporation is simply the 
tool the shareholder uses to accomplish that objective. But 
sovereigns have other tools at their disposal. 
2. Why do sovereigns need organizational law? 
Asset partitioning is the primary economic benefit of limited 
liability entities. And of course, economic considerations also 
explain why states create and own legally separate entities. Because 
they are separate from the state itself, such entities can more easily 
pledge assets to obtain financing for development and other 
projects.156 Likewise, state-owned entities can waive sovereign 
immunity without jeopardizing the state’s own assets.157 However, 
here too, sovereign states differ from other shareholders. The 
reason is that organizational law’s economic attributes are 
inextricably tied to the law of foreign sovereign immunity. 
The following discussion explains, in simplified form, how the 
U.S. law of foreign sovereign immunity affects the consequences of 
a court’s decision to disregard the separate legal status of a state-
owned entity. Again, bear in mind that the discussion focuses on 
liabilities arising out of commercial activity. Although the 
discussion applies generally to other kinds of liability, the rules of 
sovereign immunity are somewhat less protective in other contexts 
(e.g., expropriation).158 
a. Traditional veil piercing; sovereign immunity’s owner-shielding 
function. Sovereign states enjoy natural advantages over their 
 
 155. Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1231 n.14  
(9th Cir. 2005). 
 156. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 625–26 (1982). 
 157. See Bank of N.Y. v. Yugoimport, 745 F.3d 599, 614 n.14 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 158. As noted supra note 47, and more fully discussed below, a creditor whose claim 
arises out of commercial activity (and who does not benefit from a waiver of execution 
immunity or an arbitration award) cannot attach and execute upon property of a foreign 
state used for a commercial activity in the United States without demonstrating that the 
property “is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). This requirement of a nexus between the property and the liability-
generating activity does not exist in expropriation and other cases. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610(a)(3) (exception to attachment and execution immunity in expropriation cases). In 
these other settings, the FSIA affords less protection to state-owned assets. Despite this 
difference, the discussion in the main text applies generally to expropriation and other cases, 
as U.S. law still protects the bulk of a foreign state’s property by limiting attachment and 
execution to property used for a commercial activity in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). 
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creditors. To be sure, all potential debtors can engage in judgment-
proofing strategies, at a cost.159 But for sovereign states, the 
protection is automatic. The state’s most valuable assets are within 
its own borders, where they are accessible to creditors only to the 
extent its own law and institutions make them available. To escape 
these restrictions, foreign creditors must look for attachable  
assets abroad. 
That task will prove difficult. Under U.S. law, execution 
immunity protects property located in the United States and owned 
by a foreign sovereign or its political subdivisions.160 This 
protection is absolute unless the property is “used for a commercial 
activity in the United States.”161 Even when that requirement is 
satisfied, a creditor must also show (subject to exceptions) that the 
property “is or was used for the commercial activity upon which 
the claim is based.”162 Put differently, the default rule is that the 
creditor must link the commercial asset it wishes to seize to the 
liability-generating activity.163 
As noted, there are exceptions, often focused on the nature of 
the creditor’s claim (like the exceptions for expropriation in 
violation of international law and for state-sponsored terrorism).164 
 
 159. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
147 (1998). 
 160. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). The rule in § 1610(a) also applies to a foreign state’s agencies 
or instrumentalities (such as state-owned firms), but §1610(b) withdraws attachment and 
execution immunity from such entities in additional circumstances. 
 161. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). 
 162. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). 
 163. Although the legislative history on this provision is sparse, the requirement 
arguably serves the FSIA’s broader goal of withdrawing immunity to the extent (but only to 
the extent) a foreign state enters the market as a commercial actor. See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is somewhat unusual to block a creditor from attaching 
unrelated commercial assets, as this protection exceeds that normally afforded to a private 
commercial entity, and also exceeds the protection afforded to foreign states under the law 
of other countries. See, e.g., State Immunity Act, (1978) § 13(4), HALS. STAT. (UK). Finally, note 
that, where a state-owned entity engages in commercial activity in the United States, it  
places all of its assets at risk, whether or not used for a commercial activity of any kind.  
28 U.S.C. § 1610(b). 
 164. Leaving aside a creditor’s ability to contract for greater rights (through a waiver 
of execution immunity or an arbitration clause), there are several contexts in which U.S. law 
lets creditors reach property “used for a commercial activity in the United States” without 
demonstrating a link between the property and the claim. These include cases of  
state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7); expropriation in violation of  
international law, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(3); judgments establishing rights in certain property,  
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These exceptions relieve the creditor of the need to demonstrate a 
relationship between the attached property and the liability-
generating activity. All the creditor must show is that the property 
is used for a commercial activity in the United States. In disputes 
arising out of commercial activity, however, the most relevant 
exceptions are contract-based. A creditor can avoid the need to 
show a link between the property and the liability-generating 
activity if it has contracted for a waiver of the sovereign’s execution 
immunity.165 The same is true if the creditor has contracted for 
arbitration and holds a judgment based on an arbitration award.166 
Finally, bear in mind that, outside the United States, execution 
immunity sometimes offers less protection. Under U.K. law, for 
instance, and with exceptions not relevant here, execution 
immunity does not protect property of a foreign state “which is for 
the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes,” 
whether or not there is a link between that property and the 
creditor’s claim.167 
To see the relevance of these rules to veil piercing disputes, 
consider a claim arising out of a state-owned entity’s commercial 
activity, where the creditor has bargained for neither a waiver of 
execution immunity nor an arbitration clause. In a case like this, veil 
piercing has relatively little effect. To be sure, the creditor may now 
attach property “used for a commercial activity in the United 
States” and owned by the sovereign, rather than by the entity.168 
But it will also need to show that the property “is or was used for 
the commercial activity” on which it based its claim.169 And most 
such property, perhaps all of it, will be housed within the 
entity itself. 
To make this point concrete, return to the Venezuelan context 
and the figure (reprinted below) depicting PDVSA’s corporate 
structure. PDVSA’s only U.S. asset consists of shares in the U.S. 
holding company that sits atop its oil refining operations in the 
country. A creditor of PDVSA who meets the description above 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4); and cases in which the property consists of insurance obligations or 
proceeds, see 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(5). 
 165. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1). 
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6). 
 167. State Immunity Act, (1978) § 13(4), HALS. STAT. (UK). 
 168. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). 
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could in all likelihood attach those shares.170 This does not require 
disregarding the entity’s separate legal status; the shares belong to 
PDVSA. Piercing the corporate veil grants the creditor no 
additional access to attachable assets in the United States.171 
Assuming the claim relates to PDVSA’s oil operations, the 
Venezuelan government has no other U.S. assets that bear the 
requisite relationship to the claim.172 This is true even if we ignore 
all boundaries imposed by organizational law. For instance, the 
government’s equity stake in heavy industry giant CVG will 
remain immune from attachment and execution (even if this 
interest were located in the United States), as it does not have  
the requisite nexus to the creditor’s claim.173 Likewise, the 
government and its ministries could engage in unrelated 
 
 170. As an agency or instrumentality of Venezuela, PDVSA’s assets receive less 
protection. Assuming the creditor overcomes its immunity from suit, PDVSA’s property is 
subject to execution as long as the entity is “engaged in commercial activity in the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b). 
 171. The result arguably changes if the creditor benefits from a waiver of execution 
immunity or arbitration clause. See infra text accompanying notes 176–82. 
 172. It is possible to imagine cases where veil piercing does place additional U.S. assets 
owned by the state at risk. For example, a state-owned entity’s commercial activity outside 
the United States may have effects within the country, and in such a case the entity is subject 
to suit in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). Although the entity may have no U.S. 
assets, the sovereign might. And if those assets have a sufficiently close relationship to the 
creditor’s claim, execution immunity might not protect them. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). An 
example might involve actions by a Venezuelan subsidiary of PDVSA that give rise to 
liability in the United States. The broader point is simply that veil piercing need not, and 
often does not, create additional risks for the sovereign’s U.S. assets. 
 173. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). The example is counterfactual. CVG is a Venezuelan firm 
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commercial and financial transactions in the United States—say,  
importing computers, or issuing bonds—without worrying about  
creditor interference. 
In this scenario—in which the creditor benefits from neither a 
waiver of execution immunity nor an arbitration award—the 
primary risk to sovereign assets comes from the threat that other 
jurisdictions, with less protective immunity rules, might recognize 
and enforce the U.S. court’s veil piercing decision. A court in the 
United Kingdom, for instance, might treat the question as settled. 
In that event, because the State Immunity Act 1978 does not require 
a nexus between the asset and the claim, the creditor could reach 
property that the state owns and uses for a commercial purpose.174 
We might call this risk preclusion risk. It is present when courts 
pierce the veil in any context, but it assumes greater significance for 
sovereigns given the expansive execution immunity that protects 
their U.S. assets in cases arising out of commercial activity. It is 
important not to overstate this risk, however, as courts in other 
jurisdictions do not automatically recognize judgments of U.S. 
courts and in some cases are affirmatively resistant to doing so.175 
Finally, note that the threat to sovereign assets may increase 
dramatically if the creditor’s contract with the entity includes a 
waiver of execution immunity or an arbitration clause. The reason 
is that, if a court disregards the entity’s separate legal identity, it 
may require the owner to honor the entity’s contractual obligations. 
This includes the obligation to arbitrate: 
[I]t is clear that the consequence of applying the alter ego doctrine 
is that the corporation and those who have controlled it without 
regard to its separate entity are treated as but one entity, and at 
least in the area of contracts, the acts of one are the acts of all. 
There is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between the 
parent’s obligation to respond in damages for its instrumentality’s 
breach of contract and its obligation to arbitrate the measure of 
those damages.176 
 
 174. State Immunity Act, (1978) § 13(4), HALS. STAT. (UK). 
 175. See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 184–90 (2008) (summarizing practice in European countries 
with respect to recognition and enforcement of U.S. court judgments). 
 176. Fisser v. Int’l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 1960) (citations omitted); see also 
Interocean Shipping Co. v. Nat’l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(“In an appropriate situation, the corporate veil may be pierced and a party may be held 
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In all likelihood, the same principle means that courts will 
impute an entity’s waiver of execution immunity to its owner.177 
The consequences of doing so are unclear and depend on questions 
of interpretation and timing. As an initial matter, one would think 
an entity’s waiver of execution immunity would apply only to 
assets owned by the entity. If the sovereign is treated as a party to the 
contract, does the scope of the waiver expand to include the vastly 
larger pool of assets owned by the sovereign? Does the answer 
depend on whether the veil piercing decision is based on facts in 
existence at the time of contract formation? These questions do not 
have clear answers, but the implications are significant. If the 
entity’s waiver of execution immunity is imputed to the sovereign 
and construed to apply to all non-immune assets, then the creditor 
will be able to attach and execute upon property even when there 
is no link between the property and the commercial activity 
underlying its claim.178 Returning to the Venezuelan example, a 
creditor of PDVSA armed with a waiver of execution immunity 
might attach the proceeds of a sovereign bond issuance in the 
United States, even though the proceeds are unrelated to oil 
extraction and refining.179 As noted, this result is possible,  
but not certain, when the entity has agreed to a waiver of  
 
bound to arbitrate as the signatory’s alter ego.”); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n,  
64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that parent corporation can be bound by the arbitration 
clause in a subsidiary’s contract if the relationship between the entities is “sufficiently close 
as to justify piercing the corporate veil”). 
 177. See Kensington Int’l. Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2007 WL 1032269 at *15, No. 03 
Civ. 4578 LAP (Mar. 30, 2007) (imputing waiver of immunity in loan agreement executed by 
government to subsequently created state-owned corporation found to be government’s 
alter ego); EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 96 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“BCRA does not constitute Argentina’s ‘alter ego’ for the purposes of this suit. Argentina’s 
express waiver of its own sovereign immunity in the FAA, therefore, may not be imputed  
to BCRA.”). 
 178. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)(1), (6). 
 179. The issuance of bonds is undoubtedly a commercial act. See Republic of Argentina 
v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1992). Whether the proceeds are immune depends largely 
on whether the government uses the proceeds—or the intangible contract right to receive 
them—for a commercial activity in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a); cf. Aurelius Capital 
Partners v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that funds held 
in the United States by legally-separate private corporations, which were to be transferred to 
Argentine government entities, were immune from execution because “a sovereign’s mere 
transfer to a governmental entity of legal control over an asset does not qualify the property 
as being ‘used for a commercial activity’” in the United States). 
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execution immunity. When the entity has agreed to arbitrate, the 
result is effectively mandated by the FSIA.180 
To conclude, in the traditional veil piercing setting: 
• In cases that originate from the commercial activities of 
a state-owned entity, the law of sovereign immunity 
protects the state in ways that approximate, and often 
exceed, the protection offered by limited liability. The 
owner-shielding benefits of a limited liability rule are 
much reduced. 
• One risk to the sovereign’s assets stems from what we 
might call preclusion risk—i.e., the risk that later 
tribunals will treat the veil piercing question as settled 
in contexts where the law of sovereign immunity offers 
less protection. 
• The risk to the sovereign’s assets increases 
dramatically in cases where the entity’s contract 
includes provisions that, if imputed to the sovereign, 
will diminish the default protections of sovereign 
immunity law. To put the point a bit differently, 
limited liability is most important because it partitions 
contracts, not assets. 
• Finally, in other settings, such as those arising from an 
expropriation in violation of international law, 
creditors need not show a nexus between the asset and 
the liability-generating activity.181 Here, limited 
liability does more owner-shielding work, although the 
law of foreign sovereign immunity still protects most 
sovereign assets. 
b.  “Reverse” veil piercing; the more prominent role of organizational 
law. In the reverse veil piercing setting like Bancec, where a creditor 
 
 180. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6), property used for a commercial activity in the United 
States is not immune from execution if “the judgment is based on an order confirming an 
arbitral award rendered against the foreign state [including its agencies or instrumentalities], 
provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would not be inconsistent with 
any provision in the arbitral agreement.” If the arbitration agreement is accompanied by a 
waiver of execution immunity, it is possible that both provisions might be interpreted 
together to limit the creditor’s execution rights to property housed in the entity. Otherwise, 
the creditor may attach any property used for a commercial activity in the United States. 
 181. See supra notes 158, 165. 
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of the sovereign seeks to impute liability to a state-owned entity, or 
attach the entity’s assets, organizational law does more work. To 
begin with, many state-owned or state-controlled entities are not 
entitled to sovereign immunity. Under U.S. law, an entity can assert 
sovereign immunity only if it qualifies as an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state.182 To meet the definition, the 
entity must have been created under a law that entitles it to separate 
legal status, must be “neither a citizen of a State of the United 
States . . . nor created under the laws of any third country,” and 
must either be majority-owned by a foreign state or qualify as an 
“organ” of the state.183 The majority-ownership prong requires the 
state to directly own a majority stake.184 This excludes many entities 
subject to meaningful state control, including subsidiaries of state-
owned entities.185 To qualify as a state organ, the entity must 
demonstrate that it “acts as an instrument” of the state—i.e., that it 
is subject to significant state control.186 If this sounds like the test for 
alter ego liability, it isn’t—or at least courts often appear to 
understand it differently. The level of control needed for an entity 
to qualify as an “organ” appears to be less than the level needed to 
pierce the corporate veil.187 
 
 182. The term “foreign state” also includes political subdivisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
In addition, courts sometimes equate the state with entities that seem to meet the definition 
of “agency or instrumentality” when these entities serve core governmental functions.  
See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2005);  
Garb v. Republic of Pol., 440 F.3d 579, 594 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 183. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b)(2)–(3). 
 184. See generally Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003). 
 185. Id. Post-Dole, most courts take the view that subsidiaries of a state-owned entity 
can qualify as organs of a foreign state. See Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned 
Companies in the Modern Era, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 17 (2008); Janvey v. Libyan Inv. 
Auth., 840 F.3d 248, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 
F.3d 190, 199–216 (3d Cir. 2003); Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 
1097–102 (9th Cir. 2008); Corporacion Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral v. Pemex-
Exploracion Y Produccion, 832 F.3d 92, 116 (2d Cir. 2016) (concurring opinion by Winter, J.). 
But see Allen v. Russian Fed’n, 522 F. Supp. 2d 167, 183–84 (D.D.C. 2007) (apparently reading 
Dole v. Patrickson to establish that remote subsidiaries cannot meet the definition of “agency 
or instrumentality”). 
 186. See Dewhurst v. Telenor Inv. AS, 83 F. Supp. 2d 577, 594–95 (D. Md. 2000). 
 187. See, e.g., Janvey, 840 F.3d at 259 (per curiam) (“Considering whether an entity is an 
‘organ’ is, in some respects, similar to considering whether it is an ‘agent.’” (emphasis added)); 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Services Co., 1999 WL 307666, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(apparently viewing Bancec’s alter ego theory as requiring a greater level of control than the 
test for whether an entity is an “organ” of a foreign state); Gen. Star Nat. Ins. Co. v. 
Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 713 F. Supp. 2d 267, 276 & n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)  
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Of course, if an entity cannot assert sovereign immunity, it 
relies entirely on organizational law to shield it from its owner’s 
creditors (and from creditors of affiliated entities). But even if the 
entity can assert sovereign immunity, its property is generally 
“more amenable to attachment” than property owned by the state 
itself.188 If it is engaged in commercial activity in the United States 
then, in most cases, the entity’s creditors can reach any of its 
property in the United States,189 at least in an action brought by one 
of its own creditors. 
In an action by one of the state’s creditors, matters become less 
clear. If the entity is viewed as an alter ego of the state, the question 
is whether the more protective immunity rules applicable to the 
state determine the scope of immunity. I have found few cases that 
address the question, but those that do reason—correctly, in my 
view—that the sovereign’s immunities apply.190 But even under 
this approach, ignoring the entity’s separate legal status necessarily 
places at risk assets that would otherwise have been available only 
to the entity’s creditors.191 Thus, state-owned entities always gain 
some protection from organizational law. 
In summary: 
• Notwithstanding the law of sovereign immunity, 
organizational law plays an important entity-shielding 
role for state-owned entities. 
 
(noting that proof sufficient to demonstrate that an entity was an organ of a foreign state 
would not suffice to demonstrate that the entity was also the state’s alter ego). 
 188. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 794 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 189. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b). 
 190. Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“Af–Cap asserts that as an instrumentality of the Congo, SNPC’s immunity from execution 
is governed by the standard prescribed in . . . § 1610(b), . . . rather than the more restrictive 
standard of § 1610(a), . . . Af–Cap’s contention is unavailing because . . . SNPC was an alter 
ego of the Congo, and an alter ego is not a ‘separate legal entity.’”); Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 395 (D. Del. 2018) (“[A]s the Court is 
treating PDVSA as Venezuela, and therefore treating the property of PDVSA as the property 
of Venezuela, Crystallex must satisfy the narrower exception to execution immunity 
applicable to property of foreign states.”). 
 191. As in the traditional veil piercing context, a waiver of sovereign immunity in the 
sovereign’s contracts with its creditors can also be imputed to the entity. See Kensington Int’l 
Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, No. 03 Civ. 4578 LAP, 2007 WL 1032269 at *15 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 30, 
2007) (imputing waiver of immunity in loan agreement executed by government to 
subsequently-created state-owned corporation found to be government’s alter ego). 
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• Even when applicable, sovereign immunity offers less 
protection to entities owned or controlled by foreign 
states. The extent of this protection is unclear in 
“reverse” veil piercing cases, but disregarding the 
entity’s separate legal status will place at least some 
entity assets at risk. 
II.  IMPLICATIONS 
Even if organizational law added nothing to the law of foreign 
sovereign immunity—and that is clearly not so—it will remain 
relevant to state-owned entities. The FSIA anticipated that courts 
would continue to grapple with questions of organizational law192 
and did not purport to instruct them how to handle such 
questions.193 It is a given, however, that the protections offered by 
limited liability entities must yield where the corporate form is 
used to subvert important policies in the enforcing jurisdiction.194 
The FSIA is the primary statute governing U.S. courts’ use of legal 
coercion against foreign states.195 It sets the terms on which foreign 
states may engage in commerce within the United States (or in 
ways that affect the United States), and it defines the assets they 
must put at risk to do so.196 And it should inform the application of 
organizational law in this context. 
 
 192. According to the authoritative House report: “The bill is not intended to affect . . . 
the attribution of responsibility between or among entities of a foreign state . . . .” H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1487, at 12 (1976). Later amendments to the statute designed to address cases of state-
sponsored terrorism also recognize the continued relevance of organizational law—for 
example, by explicitly abrogating Bancec’s presumption of independence in certain cases. See, 
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (allowing creditors holding judgments against a foreign state in 
certain terrorism-related cases to seize property held by state agencies and instrumentalities 
notwithstanding the Bancec factors). 
 193. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Reading 
or Construing the Text?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555, 568 (2011). Moreover, organizational 
law inevitably affects the application of other immunity rules, such as the rule that an entity 
can qualify as an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state under the majority-ownership 
prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1603 only if it is directly owned by the state. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 
538 U.S. 468, 473 (2003). 
 194. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 630 (1982). 
 195. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 12 (noting the FSIA “sets forth the sole and 
exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity . . . before 
Federal and State courts in the United States”). 
 196. See Kensington, 2007 WL 1032269, at * 16. A foreign sovereign is not immune from 
suit in U.S. courts in lawsuits based on commercial activity within the United States, on acts 
within the United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere, and on acts that 
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A.  When (and Why) Does a Foreign State’s Control Over an  
Entity Matter? 
In this Section, I ask how courts should think about the control 
factor in veil piercing decisions. That inquiry involves two 
questions. The first relates to the alter ego theory, which permits 
veil piercing upon a finding of complete owner domination, 
potentially without regard to whether the owner’s use of control 
causes an injury to creditors.197 Can this alter ego theory be 
defended (and limited) in any principled way? Second, should it 
matter whether the sovereign’s control over the entity stems from 
its rights as owner, rather than as sovereign? 
To preface that discussion, it is important to distinguish veil 
piercing questions from questions associated with agency law 
principles. For example, a party who contracts with a state-owned 
entity might seek to hold the state liable on the theory that the state 
authorized the entity to act on its behalf.198 In the discussion to 
follow, I set agency law theories aside, for they raise different 
questions.199 Even if it is appropriate to impute the entity’s conduct 
to the state on agency-law grounds,200 the reasons have nothing to 
 
occur elsewhere in connection with non-U.S. commercial activity but that cause a direct effect 
in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 197. Courts have rejected the need to demonstrate any link between state control and 
the plaintiff’s injury. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126, 
141–42 (3d Cir. 2019). But they have left open the possibility that there must be an underlying 
equitable justification for an alter ego ruling. Id. at 146. The uncertainty perhaps reflects a 
broader uncertainty about whether veil piercing is itself a legal or equitable doctrine.  
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 480 n.4 (2001); Sam F. Halabi, Veil-Piercing’s Procedure, 
67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1001, 1016 (2015). 
 198. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 849  
(D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 199. In general, an agency relationship exists only if the principal has authorized the 
agent-entity to act on its behalf and has the right to direct the agent’s conduct. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person 
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 200. Only a few courts have interpreted Bancec “broadly to include not only corporate 
principles but also common-law rules of agency.” RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 452 reporter’s note n. 7 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2017). However, I am aware of no courts that have rejected the application of agency 
law principles to state-owned entities. In such cases, liability is also consistent with 
international law, which attributes the actions of a legally-separate entity to its state owner 
when the state “has authorized an act, or has exercised direction and control over it.”  
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do with organizational law. In such cases, liability follows not 
because the government has abused the corporate form but because 
the government has authorized the agent to act on its behalf.201 
The clarification is minor but necessary, because courts 
applying the alter ego theory often refer to dominated entities as 
“agents” of the state without intending to invoke agency law. 
Bancec is an early example. Recall that the Court’s alter ego test 
covers situations “where a corporate entity is so extensively 
controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is 
created.”202 Despite the reference to a principal-agent relationship, 
it is clear that the Court in fact “applied a veil piercing or ‘alter ego’ 
analysis.”203 The same is true of most cases involving state-owned 
entities, notwithstanding occasional references to agency law.204 
For the sake of doctrinal clarity, it would be best for courts to clearly 
“distinguish situations in which liability is imposed . . . because of 
the existence of the agency relation, in our common-law 
understanding of that relation, from cases in which the corporate 
veil . . . is pierced for other reasons of policy.”205 The latter  
 
Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with Commentaries, Art. 8 cmt. 8, 2001. 
 201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
 202. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1982) 
 203. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 452 reporter’s note n. 7 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017). 
 204. This tendency also exists in cases involving traditional corporations. As the 
Reporter’s Note to the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14M puts it: 
Unfortunately, however, the courts have not always observed the distinction 
between these two separate bases for parent’s liability. When liability is fastened 
upon the parent it is said that the subsidiary is a “mere agent.” The result has been 
a weakening and muddying of the term “agent” and a failure by courts to state the 
real reasons for their decisions. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M reporter’s note (AM. L. INST. 1958). Some cases do 
analyze agencies theories separately in the sovereign context. See, e.g., Transamerica Inc. v. 
La Republica de Venez., 200 F.3d 843, 849–50 (D.C. Cir. 2000); S & Davis Int’l, Inc. v. Yemen, 
218 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2000). However, even in these exceptions, the analysis of agency 
law often collapses into an “alter ego” inquiry into domination, as the court investigates 
whether the sovereign observed traditional corporate formalities. Thus, in S & Davis 
International, the court’s agency-law discussion references the lack of proof that the state-
owned entity had “papers of incorporation and corporate structure, . . . a board of 
directors[,] . . . financial accounts in its own name,” etc. S & Davis Int’l, 218 F.3d at 1299. 
 205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M reporter’s note (AM. L. INST. 1958). Note 
that the FSIA may not permit jurisdiction over foreign states based on a theory of apparent 
authority. Compare First Fid. Bank v. Gov’t of Ant. & Barb., 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(recognizing jurisdiction based on apparent authority), with Phaneuf v. Republic of Indon., 
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(and larger) subset of veil piercing cases is the subject of the 
discussion below. 
1. A more principled justification for the alter ego theory 
Bancec’s alter ego theory permits veil piercing where an entity 
is “so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of 
principal and agent is created.”206 The disjunctive test is somewhat 
unusual; as noted, when faced with a non-sovereign shareholder, 
courts sometimes frame the inquiry in disjunctive terms but 
typically recognize that control alone will not suffice unless the 
control results in some harm to third parties.207 In the sovereign 
context, however, courts routinely emphasize that “domination” of 
the entity will suffice to disregard the separate legal personhood of 
a government instrumentality.208 
Despite embracing the alter ego theory, Bancec offered no 
explicit rationale for why extensive control, without more, justifies 
disregarding the entity’s separate legal status. Moreover, as in the 
traditional context involving non-sovereign owners, the multi-
factor tests courts invoke to guide alter ego analysis can border on 
the incoherent.209 For instance, no policy of importance to U.S. law 
is implicated by a foreign state’s failure to observe “ordinary 
 
106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the commercial activity exception to sovereign 
immunity requires a showing of actual authority). 
 206. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629. Although Bancec’s articulation of the control inquiry refers 
to the creation of a principal-agent relationship, it “is in fact most similar to the ‘alter ego’ or 
‘piercing the corporate veil’ standards applied . . . to determine whether the actions of a 
corporation are attributable to its owners.” Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1080 (9th Cir. 
2009). In principle, agency law is distinct and potentially allows for liability in situations 
where an alter ego theory would not. Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 849. However, the cases often 
blend the inquiry together. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm. (Bridas I), 345 F.3d 347, 
358 (5th Cir. 2003); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Phil., 965 F.2d 1375, 1382 
(5th Cir. 1992). 
 207. See supra notes 74, 109. 
 208. See Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia, de P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 1277, 1284  
(11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a 
relationship of principal and agent is created, the [Bancec] Court observed that one may be 
held liable for the actions of the other.”); Dewhurst v. Telenor Inv. AS, 83 F. Supp. 2d 577, 
589 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that, although parent corporation had no completely controlled 
subsidiary, “the court may pierce the corporate veil if doing so would avoid fraud or 
injustice”); DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Hond., 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 214–17 (D.D.C. 2014);  
LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicar., 115 F. Supp. 2d 358, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting 
fraud or injustice as a separate ground for piercing the corporate veil). 
 209. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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corporate formalities.”210 Nor is it helpful to observe that a state-
owned entity’s “profits go to the government.”211 Because foreign 
states will often be extensively involved in entity operations,212 the 
risk is that Bancec’s alter ego test will withdraw the protections of 
limited liability when doing so advances no discernible policy 
embedded in U.S. law. 
Despite this risk, it is possible to confine Bancec’s alter ego test 
to an appropriate set of cases. The majority opinion in Bancec 
explicitly links veil piercing to cases in which the corporate form 
“is interposed to defeat legislative policies.”213 And, without trying 
to define the full set of relevant statutory policies, the majority 
opinion makes clear that the FSIA plays a central role. Thus, the 
Bancec majority emphasized that a decision to respect Bancec’s 
separate legal status would let the Cuban government “obtain relief 
in our courts that it could not obtain in its own right without 
waiving its sovereign immunity and answering for” its 
expropriation of the defendant’s assets.214 The Cuban government 
was the real beneficiary of the U.S. lawsuit.215 But if Cuba itself had 
sued U.S. courts, Citibank could have filed a counterclaim, at least 
for an amount up to the value of the Cuban claim.216 Cuba’s 
decision to interpose a nominally separate entity as plaintiff sought 
to escape the FSIA’s judgment that a foreign state “should not 
obtain the benefits of litigation before U.S. courts while avoiding 
any legal liabilities claimed against it and arising from that same 
transaction or occurrence.”217 Under the circumstances, to respect 
the entity’s separate legal status “would permit governments to 
 
 210. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 830 F.3d 107, 130 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 211. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 
2019). The fact that the Third Circuit devoted only three sentences to this issue suggests the 
court recognized the inanity of the question, derived from the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018). 
 212. Infra Section II.B. 
 213. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 630 (1982). 
 214. Id. at 632. 
 215. Id. 
 216. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (permitting setoff up to this amount and also allowing 
counterclaims in a greater amount when the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction 
or occurrence or when the sovereign otherwise lacks immunity); Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. 
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 364 (1955) (“It is recognized that a counterclaim based on 
the subject matter of a sovereign’s suit is allowed to cut into the doctrine of immunity.”). 
 217. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 23 (1976). 
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avoid the requirements of international law simply by creating 
juridical entities whenever the need arises.”218 
Bancec’s specific holding is tied to the rule that a foreign 
government that files suit in U.S. courts waives sovereign 
immunity with regard to certain counterclaims.219 But the principle 
is a broader one. A foreign state’s control over an entity matters, 
and justifies an alter ego finding, when the state uses this control to 
subvert the FSIA’s statutory scheme. In cases arising out of 
commercial activity, perhaps the most fundamental policy of the 
FSIA is that foreign sovereigns, and their agencies and 
instrumentalities, should not leverage immunity to gain unfair 
advantages over private commercial enterprises. This logic 
underpinned the shift from absolute to restrictive immunity under 
international law and motivated the U.S. government’s embrace of 
restrictive immunity in 1952.220 At minimum, the logic requires 
foreign states and state-owned entities engaged in commercial 
activities affecting the United States to place at risk assets 
associated with those activities.221 
In at least two scenarios, a state’s control over an entity may 
come into conflict with this requirement. First, the state’s control 
may be such that it is effectively able to direct the entity’s day-to-
day commercial activity.222 When this is the case, there is no reason 
to treat the entity’s assets as distinct from those belonging to the 
state itself. To draw that distinction is to permit the state to use the 
corporate form to circumvent the FSIA.223 Second, even if the state 
 
 218. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633. 
 219. 28 U.S.C. § 1607. 
 220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
ch. 5, subch. A, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[A]s governments increasingly engaged in 
state-trading and various commercial activities, . . . immunity deprived private parties that 
dealt with a state of their judicial remedies, and gave states an unfair advantage in 
competition with private commercial enterprise.”); Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign 
States, Comment to art. 11, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 451, 598 (Supp. 1932) (“[W]hen a State engages in 
business in competition with private persons or corporations, this competition is unfair if the 
State is not answerable in the courts of the State where the business is transacted.”). 
 221. 28 U.S.C. § 1610. 
 222. As noted, agency-law principles might also support liability in some of these cases. 
See supra note 199. 
 223. In many such cases, ignoring the corporate form will also have little effect. When 
an entity’s conduct is imputed to the state itself, recall that sovereign immunity will rarely 
allow the creditor to reach state assets not related to the liability-generating activity. See supra 
notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
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is not directly involved in a particular commercial activity, its 
domination of the entity may be so complete that it is impossible to 
distinguish the state’s assets and liabilities from those of the entity. 
Here, domination permits both the state and the entity to 
opportunistically manipulate assets and liabilities to the 
disadvantage of creditors. In such a case, veil piercing is 
appropriate to prevent such opportunism. 
One might object that I am treating Bancec’s test as conjunctive, 
requiring domination and fraud, rather than disjunctive. That is not 
what Bancec says, and it is not how most courts understand 
Bancec.224 But instead I am suggesting that, fairly read, Bancec 
understands the alter ego theory to be confined to a narrow set of 
cases in which the owner’s domination creates opportunities to 
subvert the FSIA. If that reading seems to conflict with the formal 
test articulated in Bancec, the tension dissolves upon careful reading 
of the cases, which tend to respect an entity’s separate legal status 
unless doing so would allow the sovereign to exploit the corporate 
form in some way relevant to the purposes of sovereign immunity 
law.225 Nevertheless, the cases are dominated by lengthy inquiries 
into the sovereign’s day-to-day control over the enterprise, without 
much discussion of whether this control implicates the policies 
underlying the FSIA.226 Because states will often be extensively 
 
 224. However, courts do occasionally acknowledge that an alter-ego ruling may 
require an underlying equitable justification. See supra note 197. 
 225. See, e.g., Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 633 (1982) (“Cuba cannot escape liability for acts in 
violation of international law simply by retransferring the assets to separate juridical 
entities.”); Kalamazoo Spice, 616 F. Supp. at 666 (attributing entity’s U.S. contacts to the 
Ethiopian government, which had expropriated the plaintiff’s majority stake in the entity, 
because to do otherwise would  let the government immunize itself from liability while using 
the entity as a front “to profit from its commercial activities in the United States”); S & Davis 
Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000) (basing veil piercing decision 
on a finding that an agency relationship existed, when a government ministry had effectively 
led the state-owned entity’s counterparty to believe it was contracting directly with the 
government); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that state-owned entity and the government were in agency relationship in case 
where the government had attracted foreign investors to contribute capital and expertise to 
the entity and then expropriated that investment). 
 226. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 830 F.3d 107, 130 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(plaintiffs’ evidence is “insufficient to demonstrate Iran’s disregard for Alavi’s separate 
corporate form much less Iran’s exercise of day-to-day control over Alavi”) (citation omitted); 
Transamerica v. Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[C]ontrol is relevant when it 
significantly exceeds the normal supervisory control exercised by any corporate parent over 
its subsidiary and, indeed, amounts to complete domination . . . .”); Dewhurst v. Telenor 
Invest AS, 83 F. Supp. 2d 577, 589–90 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that plaintiffs had not shown 
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involved in firm affairs,227 this inquiry risks producing results that 
undermine the statute. One improvement, then, would be to make 
clear that it is the use of control to subvert the FSIA that justifies an 
alter ego finding, not the mere fact of owner domination. 
2. Control as sovereign versus control as owner 
A second implication relates to the manner in which the 
sovereign wields control. Veil piercing doctrine has been roundly 
criticized as incoherent even when the owner is not a sovereign.228 
Multi-factor inquiries into whether the shareholder kept adequate 
records and observed other formalities seem disconnected from 
any relevant policy. But in the sovereign context, this inquiry 
becomes even more artificial.229 When applying the alter ego 
doctrine, courts routinely insist that what matters is whether the 
government inserts itself into the day-to-day operations of the 
entity,230 examining organizational structure, corporate formalities, 
and other familiar (if criticized) factors.231 But sovereigns have 
many ways to control state-owned entities.232 The fact of control 
matters, not the source. 
In general, the cases are consistent with this proposition. For 
example, in declining to respect PDVSA’s separate legal status, 
neither the district court nor the court of appeals distinguished 
between the dividends, taxes, royalty payments, legally-mandated 
 
evidence of extensive control and that the parent and subsidiary corporations “maintain their 
own separate accounting books and records, as well as conduct their own Board meetings.”); 
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that plaintiff “does not allege 
day-to-day, routine involvement of the Holy See in the affairs of the Archdiocese”); DRC, 
Inc. v. Republic of Hond., 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 215 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that FHIS “appears 
to enjoy significant autonomy in the conduct of its daily operations”). 
 227. See supra Sections I.A.2–3. 
 228. See supra note 78. 
 229. See Bridas I, 345 F.3d 347, 360 n.11 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing twenty-one separate 
factors for the district court potentially to consider on remand). 
 230. See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Arg., 800 F.3d 78, 91  
(2d Cir. 2015); Holy See, 557 F.3d at 1079 (9th Cir. 2009); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 447–48 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hester Int’l. Corp. v. Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 179–80 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 231. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Phil., 965 F.2d 1375, 1382  
(5th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e look to the ownership and management structure of the 
instrumentality, paying particularly close attention to whether the government is involved 
in day-to-day operations . . . .”). 
 232. See supra Section I.B.1. 
3.WEIDEMAIER_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/27/2021  1:47 AM 
843 Piercing the (Sovereign) Veil  
 843 
 
contributions, and other mechanisms by which the Venezuelan 
government extracted value from the firm.233 Some cases, however, 
arguably imply a need to distinguish acts the sovereign takes as 
owner from acts it takes as sovereign. In Bridas II, for example, the 
court refused to consider the government’s imposition of an export 
ban targeting a foreign-owned corporation in evaluating whether 
respecting the entity’s separate legal status would result in fraud or 
injustice.234 Despite acknowledging that the government imposed 
the ban “[t]o force Bridas’s submission” to its demand for more 
money,235 the court dismissed the export ban as an act taken in the 
exercise of “sovereign powers . . . not a wrong based on misuse of 
the corporate organizational form.”236 
One can interpret this as a statement about causation: the export 
ban’s harm was independent of—neither caused nor exacerbated 
by—the government’s ownership rights over the entity. So 
understood, the court correctly disregarded the ban. If a 
shareholder robs a corporation’s creditor at gunpoint, why should 
this justify disregarding the corporate form? However, Bridas II 
arguably implies a bit more—that the creditor must point to a 
specific misuse of the government’s power as owner.237 But it 
makes little sense to distinguish between powers exercised as 
sovereign and powers exercised as owner. The decision to pierce 
the corporate veil implies nothing about the validity of the 
sovereign’s public acts, nor does it require the court to make any 
other determination forbidden under U.S. law.238 The relevant 
 
 233. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 409–11 
(D. Del. 2018); Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126, 146–48 
(3d Cir. 2019). 
 234. Bridas II, 447 F.3d 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 235. Id. at 415. 
 236. Id. at 417. 
 237. Id. at 416 (asserting that Bridas “had to demonstrate that the Government used its 
control over Turkmenneft to commit a ‘fraud or injustice’”). Likewise, in discussing Bancec’s 
alter ego prong, the court emphasized that “the [g]overnment . . . exercised its power as a 
parent entity to deprive Bridas of a contractual remedy.” Id. at 420; see also First Inv. Corp. of 
the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 755 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Bridas II and noting that “it is not sufficient for it merely to point out an injustice that 
would result from an adverse decision. Rather, [the creditor] must show how the [sovereign] 
manipulated [the entity’s] corporate form to perpetuate a fraud or injustice”). 
 238. The act of state doctrine generally prevents federal courts declaring invalid an 
official act taken by a foreign state within its own territory. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. 
Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). But by its terms, the doctrine would not 
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question is whether, by interposing the entity between itself and a 
creditor, the sovereign seeks to subvert the FSIA, enrich itself at a 
creditor’s expense, or accomplish some other forbidden purpose.239 
There is no meaningful difference between, say, a dividend 
payment that leaves a state-owned corporation insolvent and a 
confiscatory tax (or mandatory contribution to social programs) 
that produces the same result. In both cases, a decision to respect 
the corporate form would allow the sovereign to reap the benefits 
of limited liability while inverting the usual priority structure, in 
which the corporation’s creditors have a prior claim.240 Again, it is 
the fact of control, and the purpose for which the state uses control,  
that matters. 
B.  Implications for Traditional and “Reverse” Veil Piercing Cases 
As explained in Part II, imputing a state-owned entity’s 
liabilities to the state itself need not have dire consequences.241 
Because of foreign sovereign immunity, states do not rely as 
heavily on organizational law to shield their assets from claims by 
creditors of the entity. Of course, the fact that a creditor has asked 
the court to pierce the veil implies that the creditor perceives some 
benefit from this remedy. Moreover, Bancec’s concern for comity 
and reciprocity suggests that veil piercing should remain the 
exception, not the rule.242 Nevertheless, the consequences of veil 
piercing often will be relatively modest. Despite the natural 
reluctance to impose liability on a foreign state, courts may in fact 
be too reluctant to pierce the veil. 
This is especially true when the creditor has not bargained for 
an arbitration clause or a waiver of execution immunity.243 In that 
case, the primary risk is that future courts will treat the veil piercing 
 
forbid a court to use such an act as a basis for disregarding the separate legal status of a  
state-owned entity. 
 239. See, e.g., DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Hond., 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 218 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 240. In places, Bridas II appears to recognize that acts taken in the exercise of “sovereign 
powers” can justify disregarding the entity’s separate legal status. Thus, the court 
emphasized not only that the government had substituted a thinly-capitalized entity for the 
original state counterparty, but that it had also passed laws immunizing many of the new 
entity’s assets from seizure and limiting the government’s own exposure to liability.  
Bridas II, 477 F.3d at 417, 420. 
 241. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra note 92. 
 243. See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
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issue as settled in a setting where the consequences to the sovereign 
are much more dramatic—as when a creditor asks a court to give 
preclusive effect to a veil piercing ruling in a jurisdiction where the 
law of sovereign immunity offers less protection.244 But this result 
is not required. Courts outside the United States do not 
automatically recognize the judgments of U.S. courts245 and may be 
especially unlikely to do so in settings where recognition involves 
significant stakes for foreign governments. Even under U.S. law, 
preclusion doctrine is sufficiently flexible for courts to deny 
preclusive effect to a finding made in a lawsuit that involved 
significantly lower stakes.246 Again, I am not suggesting that veil 
piercing should be routine, nor advocating for a doctrine that looks 
materially different from the normal setting involving non-
sovereign shareholders. But to the extent that courts view veil 
piercing as especially problematic in the sovereign context, they 
should recognize that this instinct may overstate the importance of 
organizational law in protecting sovereign assets.247 
However, matters look quite different when a creditor of the 
sovereign seeks to reach assets belonging to a state-owned entity. 
Concerns for comity and reciprocity are still relevant. But because 
sovereign immunity does not afford state-owned entities the same 
protections,248 organizational law plays a more important role in 
preserving the entity’s access to credit and in allowing foreign 
states to pursue economic development and other objectives.249 
This is obvious when an entity is neither majority-owned by a 
 
 244. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 245. Baumgartner, supra note 175. 
 246. Under U.S. law, for example, a court’s decision to pierce the veil will not 
automatically benefit another creditor (i.e., not the creditor who obtained the judgment). In 
such cases, preclusion turns on whether the defendant had sufficient incentive to litigate in 
the first action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330–31 (1979). 
 247. In addition, state-owned entities may bargain for additional protection for their 
sovereign owners. Bond indentures, for instance, commonly include “no recourse against 
others” clauses protecting shareholders and other third parties. See Glenn D. West & Natalie 
A. Smeltzer, Protecting the Integrity of the Entity-Specific Contract: The “No Recourse Against 
Others” Clause—Missing or Ineffective Boilerplate?, 67 BUS. LAW. 39 (2011). Courts often 
interpret such clauses narrowly to bar only contract claims. LaSalle National Bank v. 
Perelman, 141 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459–63 (D. Del. 2001). Moreover, courts might refuse to give 
such a clause effect when a veil piercing claim is premised on a shareholder’s intentional 
wrongdoing. See West & Smeltzer, supra. Despite these limitations, “no recourse against 
others” clauses can offer some protection against veil piercing claims. Id. 
 248. See supra Section I.B.2.b. 
 249. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 625–26 (1982). 
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foreign state, nor controlled by the state to an extent sufficient to 
make it an “organ” of the state. In that case, the entity is not an 
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and cannot assert 
sovereign immunity at all.250 But even if it qualifies as an agency or 
instrumentality, the entity will receive less protection.251 It will, by 
definition, experience the risk of losing assets that would otherwise 
have been unavailable to creditors. In this context, veil piercing 
should be reserved for exceptional cases in which the decision to 
respect the corporate form will enable the state to subvert the FSIA, 
immunizing itself for conduct for which the statute would 
otherwise impose liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Recognizing that sovereign states are different from other 
owners of limited liability entities need not imply radical revisions 
to organizational law. Still, the differences are fundamental. 
Sovereign states do not need organizational law as much, or in the 
same ways, as other owners. Because the law of foreign sovereign 
immunity automatically confers significant owner protections, 
there is an argument that courts should be more willing, rather than 
less, to pierce the veil in this context. A principled veil piercing 
doctrine, however, should impute an entity’s conduct and liabilities 
to the sovereign only when it has used its control to defraud a 
creditor or to subvert the policies embedded in the FSIA. Moreover, 
courts should be less willing to pierce the veil when the entity’s 
contracts include clauses, especially arbitration clauses and waivers 
of sovereign immunity, that will significantly expand the 
sovereign’s potential losses. If there is a need for special solicitude 
in this context, it is to protect state-owned entities from creditors of 
their sovereign owners. Such entities depend more heavily on 
organizational law for protection, and considerations of comity and 




 250. See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
